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REALIZING RELIABILITY IN FORENSIC 
SCIENCE FROM THE GROUND UP 
JESSICA D. GABEL* 
 
This Article emphasizes that forensic flaws persist and that 
deficiencies in forensic science have harrowing implications for criminal 
justice.  In the wake of numerous calls for forensic reform, I propose that 
we use existing models and frameworks already in place to improve the 
quality and cost of the U.S. forensic science program, rather than creating 
an entirely new and unaffordable system.  At bottom, this Article calls for 
collaboration between crime labs, universities and research centers, and 
the criminal justice system with the goal of making forensic science more 
reliable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Forensic science is a fractured and burdened discipline.  Five years 
ago, in 2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) published a 
revealing report announcing that forensic science is broken.1  Depending on 
the audience, reactions to the NAS Report ran the gamut, from calling it 
predictable to groundbreaking to misleading.2  In many respects, although it 
could hardly be characterized as new information, the NAS Report laid 
forensic science’s shortcomings to bare and brought to the surface the 
weaknesses that have plagued forensic science for decades.3  Moreover, the 
NAS Report underscored a harsh truth: faulty forensic science has 
contributed to convicting innocent people—and will continue to do so if the 
status quo persists.4 
 
1 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING NEEDS OF FORENSIC SCI. CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL OF NAT’L ACADS., STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 14 (2009) [hereinafter NAS REPORT]. 
2 See Matt Clarke, Crime Labs in Crisis: Shoddy Forensics Used to Secure Convictions, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS, http://goo.gl/UXrlgI (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (explaining that crime 
lab officials “reacted with predictable outrage” to the NAS report); Gregory S. Klees, 
SWGGUN Initial Response to the NAS Report, SCIENTIFIC WORKING GRP. FOR FIREARMS & 
TOOLMARKS, http://goo.gl/PzoH76 (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) (“The [Scientific Working 
Group for Firearms and Toolmarks] has been aware of the scientific and systemic issues 
identified in this report . . . .”). 
3 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (pointing to the “variability in capacity, oversight, 
staffing, certification, and accreditation across federal and state jurisdictions” and the 
“backlogs in state and local crime laboratories” as two symptoms of the broken state of 
forensic science). 
4 JON B. GOULD ET AL., PREDICTING ERRONEOUS CONVICTIONS: A SOCIAL SCIENCE 
APPROACH TO MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE 76 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/hBSsyV; see 
also NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4. 
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American courts have improperly legitimized various forensic 
disciplines without subjecting them to the kind of scrutiny that would be 
required of novel scientific or technical evidence today.  Courts accept the 
untested view that “science,” such as fingerprinting and hair analysis, is (1) 
generally accepted, (2) science, and (3) reliable.  Such unsupported 
conclusions have lacked adequate scrutiny, whether from a scientific or a 
legal perspective.  Take forensic fingerprint analysis.  The common—yet 
unrealistically romantic—starting point is that there are no two fingerprints 
exactly alike in the world.  That assumption produces the further 
assumption that fingerprint analysis must be correspondingly reliable.  This 
logic is erroneous. 
For example, forensic science and its resulting expert testimony sealed 
the fate of Bennie Starks during his trial for a brutal rape in 1986.5  At trial, 
the State’s forensic serologist testified that, based on her analysis of a 
semen sample taken from the victim’s underpants and a sample obtained 
from Starks, she could not exclude Starks as the source.6  The prosecution 
also hired dentists Dr. Carl Hagstrom and Dr. Russell Schneider (who self-
identified as experts in forensic odontology) to testify that bite marks on the 
victim’s shoulder had been made by Starks.7  The dentists testified that after 
comparing the evidence, photos, X-rays, and a model of Starks’s teeth, the 
bite marks shared sixty-two similar characteristics with Starks’s teeth.8  
After hearing these forensic “experts” testify that scientific evidence tied 
the defendant to the crime, the jury convicted Starks of two counts of 
aggravated criminal sexual assault, attempted aggravated sexual assault, and 
aggravated battery.9  Starks was sentenced to sixty years in prison.10 
In 2006, after spending nearly twenty years behind bars, a DNA test 
categorically excluded Starks as the source of the semen.11  Additionally, 
two other odontologists’ independent examinations of the bite mark 
evidence completely discredited the conclusions and testimonies presented 
at trial.12  Their reports pointed out that the examination method used by the 
State’s odontologists had since been rejected by its own creators and 
concluded that the dentists “misapplied the methodology and used flawed 
 
5 People v. Starks, 975 N.E.2d 71, 72 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012). 
6 Id. at 73, 77. 
7 Starks v. City of Waukegan, No. 09 C 348, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *2, *5–6 
(N.D. Ill. May 21, 2013). 
8 Starks, 975 N.E.2d at 73; see also Starks, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *2, *5. 
9 Starks, 975 N.E.2d at 72–73. 
10 Id. at 72. 
11 Id. at 77. 
12 Id. 
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preservation and photography techniques.”13  The appeals court ordered 
Starks released on bond pending a new trial.14  His convictions were 
vacated and the last charges dismissed in January 2013.15  Although Starks 
is free today, the lack of lab oversight and forensic standards leaves forensic 
science distrusted and vulnerable to manipulation.  During the twenty years 
Starks spent behind bars, advancements in forensic science technology 
progressed exponentially, yet the system continues to suffer from fatal 
flaws and a low threshold of reliability. 
Indeed, five years after the NAS Report, the so-called “Path Forward” 
seems murky, and various political logjams have barricaded the road to 
reliability.  I posit that reliability—the bedrock of forensic science—
remains a fleeting notion, because efforts at reform have lacked 
coordination and implementation.  The only way to adequately address the 
flaws brought to light through the NAS Report is to align the various 
stakeholders and make a concerted effort from all facets of forensic science, 
rather than waiting for guidance through a frustrated and exhausted 
legislative and judicial process. 
Although impossible to quantify, the number of wrongfully convicted 
individuals is at least in the hundreds.16  Unreliable science presents itself in 
a virtual smorgasbord of ways, from the routine (contamination) to the 
egregious (forensic misconduct) and everything in between (misrepresented 
or exaggerated results, misinterpretation of results, lack of research for 
basic assumptions, unqualified analysts, inconsistent lab practices).  
Regardless of the root causes of the forensic flaws, the NAS Report clearly 
issued a “call to arms” to reform forensic science from the top down by 
proposing the creation of a centralized National Institute of Forensic 
Science (NIFS).17  Little has been done, however, to achieve reform.  
Indeed, legislation has crawled to a standstill (i.e., dead in the water) several 
 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 74. 
15 See Starks v. City of Waukegan, No. 09 C 348, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71610, at *11 
(N.D. Ill. May 21, 2013).  Starks brought a civil suit against the two dentists and the forensic 
serologist (among others) for violating his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process by 
intentionally misapplying the methodologies that led to their conclusions, knowingly giving 
false testimony to the jurors, and conspiring to secure Starks’s conviction.  See id. at *2–3, *6. 
16 See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and 
Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (2009). 
17 See The NAS Report Update, 7 EVIDENCE TECH. MAG. 12, 13 (March–April 2009) (“The 
number-one recommendation offered in the NAS report call[ed] for the formation of an 
independent federal entity, the National Institute of Forensic Science . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
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times in Congress, and certain constituencies have brought stiff resistance 
to reforms.18 
With the exception of DNA, no single forensic technique yet has the 
ability to definitively link an evidence sample to its source.19  Ability is 
very different from invariable actuality, however; even DNA evidence has 
its limitations and stress points.20  Deficiencies in forensic science have 
harrowing implications, and the number of exonerations in recent years has 
underscored the very real threat that innocent people can be convicted.  The 
reality of wrongful convictions has risen to the forefront of public 
awareness through the work of the Innocence Project and other 
organizations.21  Of course, there are numerous factors that relate to 
wrongful convictions outside of faulty forensic evidence—witness 
misidentification, false confessions, jailhouse snitches22—but in some ways, 
the public conception of erroneous convictions, and that DNA will cure 
them all, represents a somewhat myopic view. 
The Innocence Project predominantly accepts cases where biological 
evidence is available for DNA testing.23  That only applies to a small subset 
of cases with potential claims of actual innocence.  For each case where 
DNA is able to definitively exonerate an individual, there are many more 
 
18 See Bernadette Mary Donovan & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward—or Has It Been a Path Misplaced?, 36 
CHAMPION 22, 23–24, 27 (2012) (outlining issues with the Criminal Justice and Forensic 
Science Reform Act—which proposes federal oversight in the form of an agency located 
within DOJ, in stark contrast to the NAS Report’s emphasis on independence from law 
enforcement—and describing opposition from prosecutors and forensic scientists to defense 
counsel’s use of the NAS Report). 
19 In Law and Order terms, accuracy and precision are “two separate yet equally 
important” concepts.  “Accuracy” evaluates whether the correct result can be reached and 
what the strength of that result is; “precision” measures the repeatability or reproducibility of 
the same result.  See Jessica D. Gabel, Probable Cause from Probable Bonds: A Genetic 
Tattle Tale Based on Familial DNA, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 23 (2010); Quality 
Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratories, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/NE3wL4 (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
20 William C. Thompson et al., Forensic DNA Statistics: Still Controversial in Some 
Cases, 36 Champion 12, 12 (2012) (“[W]hen labs try to ‘type’ samples that contain too little 
DNA, or DNA that is too degraded, the results of the DNA test can be unreliable.”). 
21 Wrongful convictions are also not a creature of the twentieth century.  In Perry’s Case, 
14 How. St. Tr. 1312 (1660), a servant named Perry went to search for his master, Harrison, 
after Harrison went missing.  Perry disappeared, but was found with some of Harrison’s bloody 
items.  Id. at 1313–14.  Harrison’s body was never found, and Perry gave inconsistent stories.  
Id. at 1314–16.  Perry was hanged.  Id. at 1319.  Harrison returned some time later with a story 
of being robbed, taken by force to Turkey, and forced into slavery.  Id. at 1313. 
22 See GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at iii, xii. 
23 See About the Innocence Project, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/iLWcRE (last 
visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
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equally innocent people in cases where DNA evidence is lacking.24  Relying 
on the postconviction process to correct the problem simply puts a Band-
Aid on a gaping wound.  We can do better.  DNA may provide the “get out 
of jail free” card in certain cases, but its absence in others nearly ensures 
that both the convictions and any bad forensic practices involved will 
persist. 
To prevent wrongful convictions (as opposed to just responding to 
them), the NAS Report concluded that problems with forensic evidence 
could “only be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current 
structure that supports the forensic science community in this country.”25  
To be clear, the NAS Report was not the first conscious conclusion that 
forensic science needs work.26  Moreover, the Report was not the first 
suggestion that the mechanisms for change should occur at the federal 
level.27  It probably will not be the last. 
The spate of legislation the NAS Report has spawned over the past few 
years represents a laudable but failed effort to repair a broken system.28  
The top-down mentality of restructuring forensics essentially sweeps 
everything behind a gigantic curtain in an attempt to control all of the loose 
pieces in a one-size-fits-all manner.  But a careful evaluation of the bottom 
of that curtain reveals the wizard’s feet peeking out: reforms are plagued by 
underfunded entities, unrealistic budgets, and permissive language that 
strips real reform of any enforcement power.  Simply put, if we continue to 
suggest a national entity to overhaul forensic science in a grandiose and 
unrealistic fashion, then we will continue to tabulate wrongful convictions 
based on bad science. 
Having formerly argued that we need a federal agency devoted to the 
reliable development and distribution of sound forensic science,29 history 
 
24 See Nancy Petro, Federal Grant Will Target Wrongful Conviction Cases with No DNA, 
WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS BLOG (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:50 AM), http://goo.gl/VnJ84V (“The vast 
majority of criminal cases—some estimate up to 90 percent—do not have DNA evidence to 
help settle claims of wrongful conviction.”). 
25 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at xx. 
26 See id. at xix (noting that the impetus of the report was congressional recognition “that 
significant improvements are needed in forensic science.”). 
27 See id. at xx (explaining that the consistent message conveyed to the NAS committee 
by guest speakers in various areas of the forensic science industry was that a federal system 
is necessary to effectuate reform); see also Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, 
H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. (2013). 
28 See Donovan & Ungvarsky, supra note 18, at 23–26 (outlining the shortcomings of 
legislation proposed in the wake of the NAS Report). 
29 See Jessica D. Gabel & Ashley D. Champion, Response, Regulating the Science of 
Forensic Evidence: A Broken System Requires a New Federal Agency, 90 TEX. L. REV. SEE 
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coupled with reality tells me that legislative gridlock and territorial pissing 
contests may make this impossible.  Thus, while I still maintain that 
centralization is the key, I now advocate for a grassroots effort in creating a 
reliable forensic framework from the ground up, rather than the top down.  
Cooperation and collaboration across all levels of the criminal justice 
commerce stream is, in my view, the only currently accessible method.  In 
addition, bringing universities—the bastions of scientific research—into the 
framework will increase the speed and accuracy, while reducing the costs, 
of developing standards.  Law enforcement, forensic analysts, research 
scientists, and lawyers need to recognize that forensic science does not exist 
in a vacuum, and if errors continue to multiply, then we are left with a 
system that only slides deeper into disrepair. 
This Article proceeds in five parts.  Part I focuses on the science 
behind forensics and highlights some of the misconceptions regarding the 
validity of some disciplines.  Part II discusses previous attempts at forensic 
reform in the United States.  Part III discusses the obstacles to 
implementing a federal forensic science entity and national standards, 
including potential constitutional challenges and the ever-present issue of 
locating funding for such an endeavor.  Part IV proposes that, rather than 
creating an entirely new framework, we should leverage existing 
frameworks already in place to improve the quality and cost of the U.S. 
forensic science program.  Finally, Part V outlines some works-in-progress, 
notably the U.K.’s major overhaul, and suggests that we capitalize on 
lessons already learned from those who have transformed forensics into a 
science. 
I. FORENSICS: FAR FROM SCIENTIFIC CERTAINTY 
“[Forensic science] is justice’s best friend, but it has to not only be used right but done 
right.”30 
Despite the authority with which television and movie crime dramas 
depict forensic science results, the practice sometimes falls short of that 
“used and done right” standard.  Popular culture, news outlets, and public 
perception guide the belief that forensic evidence is reliable and absolute 
proof of an individual’s guilt.  In fact, forensic evidence has the essential 
hallmarks of certainty that juries need and society craves.  Most people 
agree that it would be a miscarriage of justice to imprison an innocent 
 
ALSO 19, 26–27 (2011) (arguing that a federal agency should be created to regulate forensic 
services nationwide). 
30 Richard Willing, Errors Prompt States to Watch Over Crime Labs, USA TODAY, Mar. 
31, 2006, at 3A (quoting Texas State Senator Juan “Chuy” Hinojosa). 
290 JESSICA D. GABEL [Vol. 104 
person.31  Consequently, we want to be sure that we are convicting the right 
person.  In many cases, forensic evidence closes the confidence gap left 
open by these concerns and seals the defendant’s fate.32  It has the power to 
move the jury from maybe to guilty, and everyone can sleep better at night 
because “science” solidified the conviction.33  The forensic analysts, then, 
are the criminal justice system’s rock stars, bringing their objective 
scientific skill and authority to an otherwise emotionally charged process.34  
Yet, “public crime laboratories are not the sanctuaries of science we 
believed them to be.”35  Even the Supreme Court has recognized that 
“[s]erious deficiencies have been found in the forensic evidence used in 
criminal trials.”36  It is undeniable, and the “legal community now 
concedes, with varying degrees of urgency, that our system produces 
erroneous convictions based on discredited forensics.”37 
A. “SCIENCE” SHORT OF THE NTH DEGREE 
In tracking the 311 cases of postconviction exoneration brought about 
by DNA testing, the Innocence Project estimates that the average sentence 
served in those cases is about thirteen years, with eighteen people sentenced 
to death before DNA was able to prove their innocence.38  Moreover, of 
those 311 cases, 141 of the original convictions involved “unvalidated or 
improper forensic science.”39  Given the now-universal nature of DNA 
 
31 But see In re Davis, 557 U.S. 952, 955 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“This court has 
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a 
full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is ‘actually’ innocent.”). 
32 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 4 (“[I]n some cases . . . testimony based on faulty 
forensic science analyses may have contributed to wrongful convictions of innocent people.”). 
33 This is not to say that forensic science does not have its place in the criminal justice 
system.  Rather, it needs to be presented in context and in light of its weaknesses. 
34 For example, Dr. Henry Lee is an accomplished forensic analyst who has worked on 
high-profile cases, including the JonBenét Ramsey case, the O.J. Simpson case, and the 
Casey Anthony case.  See Bianca Prieto & Walter Pacheco, Star Criminalist Joins Defense 
Team, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 15, 2008, at B1; Famous Cases, DRHENRYLEE.COM, 
http://goo.gl/Zob0TH (last visited Oct. 15, 2013). 
35 Craig M. Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science: How Appropriate Funding and 
Government Oversight Can Further Strengthen the Forensic Science Community, 17 TEX. 
WESLEYAN L. REV. 441, 442 (2011) (emphasis omitted). 
36 Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 319 (2009). 
37 Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475, 491 (2006). 
38 See Know the Cases: DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://goo.gl/NCkK94 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
39 See Know the Cases: Search the Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/viN1Z5 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
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testing, “it is possible to forget that, for decades, law enforcement had to 
rely on much less accurate forensic methods.”40 
Although today’s criminal cases often revolve around whether there is 
DNA—even for low-level property crimes—forensic science traditionally 
encompasses many different disciplines.  Those disciplines include “general 
toxicology, firearms/toolmarks, questioned documents, trace evidence, 
controlled substances, biological/serological screening, fire debris/arson 
analysis, impression evidence (e.g., fingerprints, shoe/tire prints), blood 
pattern analysis, crime scene investigation, medicolegal death investigation, 
and digital evidence.”41  In many forensic disciplines, “the human examiner 
is the main instrument of analysis.”42  The forensic analyst examines “visual 
patterns and determines if they are ‘sufficiently similar’ to conclude that 
they originate from the same source.”43  The forensic disciplines can thus be 
divided into two main categories: lab disciplines and disciplines based on 
expert interpretation of observed patterns.44  Examples of the former include 
DNA analysis, toxicology, and drug analysis.45  Disciplines based on expert 
interpretations aim to determine a common source for patterns observed in, 
but not limited to, fingerprints, writing samples, and toolmarks.46 
In what may be an oversimplification of the distinction, the lab 
disciplines also bring quantitative results that seem to reflect objectivity.  
For example, DNA results culminate in the all-important statistical 
representation of the likelihood of a random match based on population 
genetics47—i.e., the pervasive “1 in n billion” number.  The lab-based 
forensic disciplines are deemed to be more analytical and thus more reliable 
than the more subjective “pattern identification” disciplines, which produce 
qualitative results.48  Although consideration of whether the lab disciplines 
are deserving of such deference is better saved for another article, the 
 
40 GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at 16. 
41 NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATUS AND NEEDS OF FORENSIC 
SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2006) [hereinafter STATUS AND 
NEEDS], available at http://goo.gl/UKJgzi. 
42 Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, Perspectives, and 
Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42, 43 (2013). 
43 Id. 
44 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6–7. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. at 40–41.  See generally The Use of DNA in Criminal Investigations: Hearing 
on S. 775 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 2011–2012 Leg., 195th Sess. (Pa. 2011) 
(statement of David H. Kaye, Professor of Law, Penn State Dickinson School of Law), 
available at http://goo.gl/DXdLrE. 
48 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7 (“In terms of scientific basis, the analytically based 
disciplines generally hold a notable edge over disciplines based on expert interpretation.”). 
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element of subjectivity inherent in the analysis of lab disciplines merits 
comment.  DNA analysis is subject to human error based on the 
interpretation (read: subjective analysis) of results that include, among other 
things, mixture samples, Low Copy Number DNA,49 and degraded 
evidence.50 
Distinctions aside, forensic science disciplines lack significant peer-
reviewed research of the scientific bases and validity studies that should 
support their methods.51  Fingerprint-matching techniques, for instance, 
lack “sufficient data on the diagnosticity and reliability” of even the most 
basic assumptions.52  For pattern-identification methods generally, research 
establishing the limits and measures of their performance is “sorely 
needed.”53  Although research in many disciplines would allow for more 
consistent, quantitative results, research culture has not found a foothold in 
forensic science.54  Without the requisite level of empiricism that grounds 
scientific endeavors, forensic science devolves into forensic art. 
Despite the public desire for certainty and the legal requirement to 
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, “[f]ew forensic science methods 
have developed adequate measures of the accuracy of inferences made by 
forensic scientists.”55  It seems to be common sense that every forensic 
technique should include the applicable level of “uncertainty in the 
measurements that are made.”56  Taken in isolation, the lack of scientifically 
acceptable standards for such a wide segment of forensic practices that 
continually calls itself a “science” seems quixotic. 
The disconnect between forensic research and forensic practice 
occurred long ago and is the product of a criminal justice system that 
misplaces value in that gap.  Many of the disciplines evolved solely for the 
 
49 Low Copy Number DNA usually refers to DNA from which it is difficult to obtain a 
full profile due to “damaged or degraded DNA, oligospermic or aspermic perpetrators or 
from extended interval post coital samples, where sperm have been lost over time due to the 
effects of drainage or host cell metabolism.”  DNA Analyst Training: Low Copy Number 
DNA, NAT’L FORENSIC SCI. TECH. CTR., http://goo.gl/1ah2Ip (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
50 See generally Thompson et al., supra note 20 (discussing the problems with mixture, 
low copy DNA, and degraded samples). 
51 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
52 See Jonathan J. Koehler, Fingerprint Error Rates and Proficiency Tests: What They 
Are and Why They Matter, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1077, 1079 (2008). 
53 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
54 Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 
58 UCLA L. REV. 725, 778 (2011). 
55 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 184. 
56 Id. 
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purpose of solving crimes,57 and I hazard a guess that the inability to 
challenge forensic techniques’ reliability due to the lack of solid research 
produces more convictions than acquittals.  In the absence of validation 
studies, forensic techniques were initially applied to cases; once their 
application was established, the ongoing prosecutorial use of forensic 
techniques (and a good bit of judicial notice) continued unquestioned, and 
courts cemented their longevity.58 
With a pile of cases to solve, research, repeatability, and reliability 
assessments were—quite understandably—not crime labs’ priority.  
Furthermore, implementing research and standards presents costs (in both 
workload and real dollars) that crime lab budgets simply cannot absorb.  
This steady progression to deem results acceptable, however, permitted 
forensic evidence development to continue unimpeded and elevated it to 
“sure bet” status in criminal trials.  Of course, some forensic evidence is 
more reliable than others,59 but that does not excuse a continued culture of 
“because I said so” testimony that uses loaded terminology such as 
“match,” “positively,” or “to the exclusion of all others” without the proper 
considerations of validity and rarity found in other research sciences. 
This lack of a research-oriented culture in forensic evidence leads to 
errors in the way the evidence is used in prosecutions and presented in 
courts.  In a recent study of the “predictors” of wrongful convictions, Jon 
Gould et al. concluded that forensic errors most often accumulate in 
evidence interpretation and the resulting testimony, rather than the “actual 
scientific testing.”60  In some ways, these predictors presuppose that 
“scientific testing” takes place, as opposed to analysts merely “eyeballing”61 
the evidence.  Nonetheless, Gould and colleagues do acknowledge that 
there is a fundamental lack of foundational research underlying forensic 
science disciplines.  This contributes to the eventual errors in forensic 
testimony, such as exaggerating the “inculpatory nature of the evidence by 
 
57 See Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://goo.gl/gs5CFA (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003) (“While the 
principles underlying fingerprint identification have not attained the status of scientific law, 
they nonetheless bear the imprimatur of a strong general acceptance, not only in the expert 
community, but in the courts as well.”). 
59 DNA is often heralded as the gold standard, and the NAS Report cites it as the one 
method that “has been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a high 
degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or 
source.”  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
60 See GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at xix. 
61 See Jessica D. Gabel & Margaret D. Wilkinson, “Good” Science Gone Bad: How the 
Criminal Justice System Can Redress the Impact of Flawed Forensics, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1001, 
1003–13 (2008) (outlining examples of faulty testing methods that result in wrongful convictions). 
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providing inaccurate or non-existent statistics; and misstating the certainty 
of the results when the forensic technique, such as bite mark, scent, or fiber 
analysis, does not allow for it.”62  Indeed, there are no instruments that 
measure or quantify a reasonable degree of scientific certainty when the 
“scientific certainty” really boils down to the experience of the witness and 
not much else. 
B. SPLITTING HAIRS: ANATOMY OF A CHEAP FIX 
In a 2012 sequence of investigative reports, the Washington Post 
exposed a Department of Justice (DOJ) review of hundreds of cases 
believed to contain flawed forensics.  The DOJ task force spanned nine 
years and (regrettably) focused on the work of one particular examiner 
performing hair and fiber analyses.  DOJ officials began reexamining cases 
in the 1990s after receiving reports that careless work by analysts at the FBI 
lab produced unreliable forensic results that were later used in trials.  The 
results of that DOJ review—kept silent from many alleged offenders for 
more than a decade—demonstrated that flawed hair and fiber evidence was 
used to garner convictions in numerous cases.63 
Hair and fiber evidence has long been the subject of scrutiny.64  It 
should not come as a surprise that some of the defendants against whom 
this evidence was used turned out to be innocent.  What is surprising is that 
DOJ deliberately withheld the findings from the defendants whose 
convictions resulted—at least in part—on that evidence.  Instead, DOJ 
made the findings available only to the prosecutors in the affected cases.  
The Washington Post’s investigation revealed that possibly fewer than half 
of the defendants whose hair evidence was called into question never 
learned of the task force’s review.  Based on this investigation alone, it is 
clear that numerous individuals may “remain in prison or on parole for 
crimes that might merit exoneration, a retrial or a retesting of evidence 
using DNA because FBI hair and fiber experts may have misidentified them 
as suspects.”65 
In one such case, Donald E. Gates served twenty-eight years for the 
rape and murder of a Georgetown University student based on FBI Special 
Agent Michael P. Malone’s testimony that Gates’s hair was found on the 
 
62 GOULD ET AL., supra note 4, at xix–xx, 16–19. 
63 See Spencer S. Hsu, Defendants Left Unaware of Flaws Found in Cases, WASH. POST, 
Apr. 17, 2012, at A1. 
64 See generally Clive A. Stafford Smith & Patrick D. Goodman, Forensic Hair 
Comparison Analysis: Nineteenth Century Science or Twentieth Century Snake Oil?, 27 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 227 (1996) (discussing studies showing a propensity for false 
matches in hair analysis and their role in wrongful convictions). 
65 Hsu, supra note 63. 
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victim’s body.66  DNA testing exonerated Gates in 2009.67  Even before the 
DOJ task force reviewed Malone’s work, DOJ’s Office of the Inspector 
General (OIG) issued an unsparing report on investigated “allegations of 
wrongdoing and improper practices within certain sections of the [FBI] 
Laboratory.”68  That particular report—released in 1997—specifically 
targeted Malone.  Malone’s work was the lynchpin to Gates’s conviction, 
but Gates never learned about the OIG’s report regarding Malone or his 
faulty work.69  Although eventually exonerated and released, Gates spent 
decades in prison for a crime he did not commit.70 
Benjamin Herbert Boyle was also convicted based on Malone’s 
testimony.71  Boyle’s case was part of the task force’s review, but—like 
Gates—he never learned of the investigations into Malone’s case.  In fact, 
Boyle would never have the opportunity to learn about it.  The State of 
Texas executed him in 1997.72  A prosecutor’s memo indicated that Boyle 
never would have been eligible for the death penalty had the problems in 
the FBI lab work been disclosed.73  The task force would later determine 
that Malone’s conclusions in Boyle’s case were flawed.74 
For years, scholars, attorneys, and scientists have questioned the 
validity of microscopic hair comparison.  The discipline is beset with 
weaknesses; yet, DOJ only reviewed the work of one FBI analyst—
Malone—despite the questions surrounding the integrity of the FBI lab as a 
whole.75  Of course, choosing to focus on one bad apple rather than a 
holistic repair of the tree is the easier, lower cost option.  Moreover, it 
 
66 See id. 
67 See id. 
68 MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI LABORATORY: AN 
INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-
RELATED AND OTHER CASES: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (1997) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY], available at http://goo.gl/vkqYfY. 
69 Hsu, supra note 63. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See Killer Is Executed in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at A16.  In addition to the 
faulty hair evidence, the former pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy, Dr. Ralph 
R. Erdmann, was sentenced to ten years of probation in 1992 for seven felony counts 
involving falsified autopsies in various Texas counties.  See Bobby Cervantes, DNA Testing 
Flaws Concern Attorneys, AMARILLO GLOBE-NEWS, Aug. 18, 2012, at A1; Roberto Suro, 
Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of West Coast, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 1992, at A22. 
73 Debra Cassens Weiss, Review Found FBI Hair Analysis Flaws in 250 Cases, But DOJ 
Didn’t Inform Defendants and Public, A.B.A. J. (Apr. 17, 2012, 6:00 AM), 
http://goo.gl/O2CqKL. 
74 See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 68. 
75 See id. 
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allowed the task force to blame the misconduct or ineptitude of one and 
ignore the systemic failures of an entire discipline. 
The shortsightedness of such limited review, however, is palpable 
when viewed through the lens of cases that slipped through the cracks.  
Santae A. Tribble was convicted of killing a taxi driver named John 
McCormick in 1978.76  During the investigation of McCormick’s murder in 
Seat Pleasant, Maryland, a police dog uncovered a stocking mask one block 
away from the crime scene; the stocking contained thirteen hairs in total.77  
Of the thirteen, the FBI concluded through hair analysis that one belonged 
to Tribble.78  Over the course of his three-day trial, Tribble took the stand in 
his own defense, urging the jury to accept the fact that he had no connection 
to McCormick’s death.79  Nevertheless, the jurors gave weight to the one 
“matching” hair and found Tribble guilty of murder; the judge sentenced 
him to twenty years to life in prison.80 
Both in prison and while on parole, Tribble maintained his innocence, 
and in January 2012, Tribble’s lawyer succeeded in having the evidence 
retested.81  A private lab concluded through DNA testing that the hairs 
could not have belonged to Tribble.82  A more thorough analysis at the time 
of the crime—even absent DNA testing—would have revealed the same 
result: one hair had Caucasian characteristics and Tribble is African-
American.83  But a shoddy examination left an innocent man in prison for 
twenty-five years, plus another three years on top of that for failing to meet 
the conditions of his parole.84  And Tribble is, perhaps, “lucky.”  His case 
had testable DNA, and he found freedom in 2012, eight years after the task 
force completed its work.85 
 
76 See Hsu, supra note 63. 
77 See id.; see also Spencer S. Hsu, 2 Jurors Back Exoneration of Man Found Guilty in 
Death, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2012, at B1. 
78 See Hsu, supra note 63; see also Hsu, supra note 77 (describing a juror’s suspicion 
that other jurors wrongly discounted Tribble’s detailed alibi). 
79 See Hsu, supra note 63. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. 
84 Spencer S. Hsu, Conviction Vacated in 1978 D.C. Killing, WASH. POST, May 17, 
2012, at B1. 
85 See Hsu, supra note 63.  By contrast, Cameron Todd Willingham received a death 
sentence and was later executed by the State of Texas on what even staunch death penalty 
supporters deem faulty arson evidence.  Fire Expert Criticizes Investigation that Led to 
Execution, CNN JUSTICE (Jan. 7, 2011, 9:41 PM), http://goo.gl/80jCzx; see also Marc Price 
Wolf, Habeas Relief from Bad Science: Does Federal Habeas Corpus Provide Relief for 
Prisoners Possibly Convicted on Misunderstood Fire Science?, 10 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 
213, 230–31, 246–47 (2009) (analyzing the faulty science on which Willingham was 
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In another case that escaped the task force’s review, Kirk L. Odom 
was convicted of sexual assault in 1981.86  The star prosecution witness—
an FBI special agent—testified that a hair discovered on the victim’s 
nightgown was microscopically similar to Odom’s hair, “meaning the 
samples were indistinguishable.”87  To illustrate the credibility of the 
evidence, the agent also testified that he had concluded hairs to be 
indistinguishable only “eight or 10 times in the past 10 years, while 
performing thousands of analyses.”88  Although Odom presented alibi 
evidence, the jury convicted him after just a few hours of deliberation.  
Odom was paroled in March 2003 and was required to register as a sex 
offender.89 
That would have been the end of Odom’s story had it not been for his 
lawyer’s crusade to right the wrongs attributable to the erroneous hair 
comparisons.90  In February 2011, Sandra Levick (who had also represented 
Gates and Tribble) filed a motion for DNA testing under the D.C. 
Innocence Protection Act.91  In response, the government located stained 
bedsheets, a robe, and the microscopically examined hair from the crime 
scene.92  “DNA-STR testing on semen from a pillowcase and robe, as well 
as mitochondrial testing of the hair, all excluded Odom” and instead 
implicated a convicted sex offender.93  Odom was exonerated on July 13, 
2012.94 
In response to the Gates–Tribble–Odom trifecta, DOJ and the FBI 
announced a joint effort to review convictions involving FBI (and only FBI) 
analyses of hair evidence.95  For its part, the FBI appears to be in denial.  In 
a July 2012 statement, the FBI explained: 
The FBI Laboratory still conducts microscopic hair comparisons.  There is no reason 
to believe the FBI Laboratory employed “flawed” forensic techniques. 
 
convicted, and subsequently executed); David Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an 
Innocent Man?, NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, at 42. 
86 See Hsu, supra note 63. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, INNOCENCE PROJECT,  http://goo.gl/D1VBNT (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
90 See Hsu, supra note 63; see also Spencer S. Hsu, After DNA Retesting, Kirk Odom 
Exonerated, WASH. POST, July 14, 2012, at B6. 
91 See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, supra note 89; Know the Cases: Santae Tribble, 
INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://goo.gl/FOHLht (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
92 See Know the Cases: Kirk Odom, supra note 89. 
93 Id. 
94 See id. 
95 See Hsu, supra note 77. 
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The validity of the science of microscopic hair comparison is not at issue; however, 
based on recent cases, the FBI and Department of Justice are committed to 
undertaking a review of historical cases that occurred prior to the regular use of 
mitochondrial DNA testing to ensure that FBI testimony at trial properly reflects the 
bounds of the underlying science.96 
The U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia, Ronald C. Machen, 
Jr., has stated that his office would conduct “a sweeping review” of past 
cases “where hair analysis was used in part to secure convictions.”97  In 
addition to being too little, too late for some, this effort again seems to 
deliberately ignore the fact that flawed hair analysis is a widespread 
problem.98  To believe such errors occur in isolation—confined to just one 
lab or just one forensic discipline such as hair analysis—is nonsensical 
when the entire forensic discipline produces wrongful convictions because 
of analytical and structural defects.  In many cases, we continue to allow the 
criminal justice system to be held hostage by bad science, and those caught 
in the cross hairs have little recourse from a system designed to reinforce 
finality over truth.99 
C. READING THE FINE PRINT 
Questionable results may come from weak methodology, 
misapplication of methods to a specific case, second-rate analysts, or 
outright fraud.  While it may be easy to conceive of how forensic errors can 
exist in disciplines such as hair analysis, we have more difficulty 
understanding errors in established forensic techniques, such as latent print 
identification, commonly known as fingerprints.  The bedrock of fingerprint 
analysis is the familiar refrain that no two fingerprints are alike.  Indeed, 
fingerprints have general ridge patterns that make it possible to 
 
96 Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Clarifies Reporting on Microscopic 
Hair Comparisons Conducted by the Laboratory (July 13, 2012), available at 
http://goo.gl/bhoaDC. 
97 See Paul Wagner, DNA Shows Flawed Science Used at Trial, myFOXdc.com (Mar. 16, 
2012, 12:49 PM), http://goo.gl/L3nMsD; see also Hsu, supra note 63 (noting that “[Machen’s] 
office would try to review all convictions that used hair analysis” (emphasis added)). 
98 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, Microscopic Hair Comparisons: A Cautionary Tale, 46 
CRIM. L. BULL. 531 (2010) (examining the judicial history and the lack of empirical basis in 
the techniques of microscopic hair analysis and its role in wrongful convictions). 
99 See Gabel & Wilkinson, supra note 61.  In “Good” Science Gone Bad, Margaret 
Wilkinson and I called upon legislatures to consider avenues for redressing wrongful 
convictions won through junk science.  Notably, Texas responded to that challenge in June 
2013 and enacted a law that ensures access to the courts for habeas corpus writs based on 
science that is later deemed to be unreliable (or new science that did not exist at the time of 
conviction).  TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.073 (West Supp. 2013).  This effort 
should be applauded, though time will tell if other states follow suit and whether individuals 
are able to successfully use this mechanism.  
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systematically classify and compare them, and the average fingerprint 
contains between 50 and 150 points of comparison (termed “friction ridge 
analysis”).100 
But fingerprint analysis does not involve a comparison of 150 or even 
50 points of identification.  Rather, most jurisdictions in the United States 
do not require a minimum number of points between samples to sufficiently 
call the comparison a “match.”101  Even among fingerprint analysts, the 
number of points of similarity required for identification varies, ranging 
from as few as eight points to as many as twelve or more.102  So, while it 
may be that on the whole no two fingerprints are alike, there is little to 
support that six, ten, or even twelve points are a sufficiently discriminating 
means of identifying a suspect.  Moreover, such evidence is never presented 
with an indication of how accurate it might be (i.e., a quantifiable number 
that presents the analyst’s confidence in the conclusion).  It seems logical 
that the likelihood that a given print belongs to a suspect increases when 
there are more points of commonality.  Yet, the fingerprint community has 
never embraced this component because the requisite data (i.e., probability 
studies) does not exist.103 
Such a theoretical disconnect became a blatant reality in the case of 
Brandon Mayfield.  On March 11, 2004, a terrorist attack on commuter 
trains in Madrid, Spain, killed approximately 200 people and injured over 
1,400 more.104  Needing assistance, the Spanish National Police enlisted the 
help of the world-renowned FBI crime lab and its fingerprint specialists.  
Just eight days later, on March 19, the FBI identified Mayfield as the source 
of one of the fingerprints on a bag containing detonators connected with the 
 
100 See DAVID R. ASHBAUGH, QUANTITATIVE-QUALITATIVE FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO BASIC AND ADVANCED RIDGEOLOGY 1–9 (1999) (outlining the 
evolution of friction ridge analysis). 
101 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 17 (Mass. 2005) (“[M]ost 
agencies in the United States no longer mandate any specific number [of matches.]  Rather, 
the examiner uses his expertise, experience, and training to make a final determination.” 
(citation omitted)). 
102 See Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint “Science” 
Is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605, 638 (2002) (noting that the number of matching 
characteristics sufficient for identification is “entirely subjective”). 
103 See, e.g., Tamara F. Lawson, Can Fingerprints Lie? Re-weighing Fingerprint 
Evidence in Criminal Jury Trials, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 24 (2003) (finding that “[n]o one can 
say, with any certainty, whether fingerprint identification evidence is always truly accurate” 
because very little independent data exists); see also id. at 32 (recognizing that most 
“testing” of forensic evidence occurs in adversarial proceedings and is “an insufficient 
substitute for rigorous empirical study and scientific testing” (emphasis added)). 
104 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF THE FBI’S 
HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE 1 (2006), available at http://goo.gl/xzik2o. 
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attacks.105  A second examiner verified the “match,” and a unit chief 
reviewed the conclusion and concurred in the results.106  The FBI then 
learned on April 13 that the Spanish National Police performed an 
independent examination of the print comparison but could not positively 
identify Mayfield as the source.107  After meeting with FBI representatives, 
the Spanish National Police agreed it would reexamine Mayfield’s 
fingerprints.108 
The FBI ultimately arrested Mayfield on May 6.109  Mayfield was still 
in detention on May 17 when the court appointed an independent 
fingerprint examiner to review the FBI’s identification.110  On May 19, the 
independent examiner agreed with the FBI’s identification and became at 
least the fourth examiner to positively link Mayfield to the suspect print.111  
Yet, on the same day, the Spanish National Police notified the FBI that it 
had positively matched the fingerprint with Ouhnane Daoud, an Algerian 
national.112  The court released Mayfield the next day to be detained at 
home; the FBI withdrew its identification on May 24, and the case against 
Mayfield was dismissed.113 
OIG ultimately found multiple sources for the FBI lab’s error.114  One 
source of error concerned facts specific to the case—such as the similarity 
between the identified prints and Mayfield’s religious background.115  
Another source concerned general problems with the fingerprint 
identification process—including its reliance on extremely tiny details, 
inadequate explanations for differences, failure to assess the poor quality of 
the similarities, and failure to reexamine the fingerprints after the Spanish 
National Police investigation returned a negative result.116  While the 
Mayfield case may seem like an outlier, it remains true that serious errors in 
supposedly reliable and accurate methodology nearly perpetrated a 
miscarriage of justice.  Brandon Mayfield’s case is a high-profile example 
of a systemic problem that likely increases in frequency when the case is 
 
105 See id. 
106 See id. at 2. 
107 See id. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 3. 
110 See id. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. at 6. 
115 See id. at 6–7, 12 (noting that Mayfield’s religion “likely contributed to the 
examiners’ failure to sufficiently reconsider the identification after legitimate questions 
about it were raised”). 
116 See id. at 8–10. 
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merely average, neither implicating national security nor requiring multiple 
reviews of the evidence.  Perhaps what makes Mayfield’s case the 
exception is not that forensic science got it wrong but that investigators 
figured out the errors before the man was convicted.  Still, these errors 
resulted in an innocent man being investigated and detained.  Further, the 
resources of the FBI and other investigatory organizations were wasted on 
pursuing a meritless lead. 
Even beyond the Mayfield blemish, additional work is beginning to 
demonstrate that fingerprint analysis has been undermined by its own 
methodology.117  The NAS Report cites Lyn and Ralph Haber’s paper in 
which they conclude: “We have reviewed the available scientific evidence 
of the validity of the ACE-V method [of latent fingerprint identification] 
and found none.”118  The development of the ACE-V method119 itself has a 
curious chronology.  It was conveniently adopted after the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, which refused to distinguish 
technical testimony (including fingerprint identification) from scientific 
evidence, making technical testimony subject to the rigors of Daubert.120  
The decision effectively removed the cloak of invisibility for some forensic 
disciplines that rested on “technical experience,” rather than scientific 
methods as the foundation for the expert opinion.121 
Suddenly, latent print examiners needed some sort of method in 
addition to an abundance of experience and a good set of eyes.  
Consequently (and conveniently), the ACE-V method was born.  But it is 
not in the family of scientific analysis that the term “method” might 
otherwise indicate.  Despite widespread propaganda that promotes ACE-V 
as a scientific method, fingerprint analysis lacks validated standards and 
testing with respect to the process and the level of reliability needed to draw 
 
117 For a critique of fingerprint analysis technique, see generally Epstein, supra note 102. 
118 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 143 (quoting Lyn Haber & Ralph Norman Haber, 
Scientific Validation of Fingerprint Evidence Under Daubert, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 87, 
105 (2008)). 
119 One technique used to examine fingerprints is referred to as the “ACE-V” method 
(Analysis, Comparison, Evaluation, and Verification).  At the analysis stage, the examiner 
inspects the fingerprint at issue and determines if it is suitable for analysis.  The comparison 
stage requires the examiner to visually compare the prints side-by-side under a magnifier.  
The evaluation consists of the examiner determining whether certain friction ridges agree 
between the two prints.  Finally, the verification stage is meant to require a second examiner 
independently to conduct the same examination, but often this only amounts to a second 
examiner reviewing the determination of a “match,” rather than conducting an independent 
investigation.  See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 137–39. 
120 526 U.S. 137, 147–49 (1999). 
121 See Epstein, supra note 102, at 621; Lawson, supra note 103, at 15–16, 33–34. 
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conclusions about the relative similarity between two prints.122  A recent 
study has shown that when identical fingerprint evidence is presented to the 
same set of examiners for analysis, they reach different conclusions 
approximately 10% of the time.123 
Moreover, the “V” in ACE-V (which stands for “verification”) was 
meant to address the need for peer review, but the slipshod fix ignores the 
vulnerabilities of cognitive bias replete in fingerprint analysis.  The 
Mayfield case highlighted this particular weakness, but it is not an isolated 
incident and it is not limited to fingerprint analysis.  Context influences 
many aspects of the forensic process.  Forensic examiners may be aware of 
the nature and details of the particular crime or the suspect, pressured by an 
investigator to find a match between samples, or apprised of prior 
conclusions drawn by colleagues working on the same piece of evidence 
(the peer review).  All of these factors can contribute to contextual bias.124 
The contextual stimuli that permeate forensic science may be subtle or 
flagrant, but they are omnipresent.  Mayfield’s erroneous identification 
exemplified the gravity of forensic bias: “the latent fingerprint was 
examined against a pre-existing ‘target,’ without first being properly 
analyzed in isolation; the examiners were pre-armed with contextual 
information, leading them to be suspicious of their target; and the case was 
high in profile and time-urgent, increasing the need for closure.”125  Couple 
the bias component with the possibility for false positives, and the threat of 
a wrongful conviction based on flawed fingerprint evidence is very real. 
D. CRIME LAB CONTAGION: A CULTURE OF CUTTING CORNERS 
In recent years, a number of shocking crime lab scandals have gained 
media attention and grabbed headlines.  The cases appear to encompass 
errors ranging from mere negligence to outright malfeasance and occur in 
labs all over the country.  Accusations involve evidence tampering,126 
perjury,127 and withholding evidence.128  Such charges are often linked to a 
 
122 See Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification: 
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127, 131 (2008). 
123 See Bradford T. Ulery et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions by Latent 
Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PLoS ONE 1, 6 (2012). 
124 See Kassin et al., supra note 42, at 43. 
125 Id. 
126 See, e.g., Denise Lavoie, Ex-state Chemist Pleads Not Guilty, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
31, 2013, at B2. 
127 See, e.g., Madeleine Baran, Ramsey County Medical Examiner Michael McGee 
Under Investigation, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 6, 2011), http://goo.gl/5G5El7. 
128 See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The North Carolina Crime Lab Scandal, A.B.A. CRIM. 
JUST. MAG., Spring 2012, at 43, available at http://goo.gl/yL6IEb. 
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particular person or even section within the crime lab.  The problem of one, 
however, becomes the pestilence for many, because a crime lab is the sum 
of its collective parts.  When one part is infected, it can bring down the 
entire organism. 
As with the individual forensic disciplines, crime labs also lack any 
cohesive set of mandatory standards.  Depending on the crime lab, this 
creates a quality control issue.129  The crime lab accreditation process—
which implies reviews, testing, and audits—is, at best, voluntary and, at 
worst, a charitable endowment.  Many states do not require their crime labs 
to be accredited.130  Those labs that do seek accreditation do so through the 
American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation 
Board (ASCLD/LAB), the primary certifying body for crime labs.  In 1996, 
Peter Neufeld—cofounder of the Innocence Project—observed that 
“[t]here’s absolutely no reason that crime laboratories, which routinely 
make decisions that have life and death consequences for an accused 
person, should be less regulated than a clinical laboratory utilizing similar 
tests.”131 
The NAS Report noted the lack of standards for lab management and 
administration.132  Specifically, it observed: 
There is no uniformity in the certification of forensic practitioners, or in the 
accreditation of crime laboratories.  Indeed, most jurisdictions do not require forensic 
practitioners to be certified, and most forensic science disciplines have no mandatory 
certification programs.  Moreover, accreditation of crime laboratories is not required 
in most jurisdictions.  Often there are no standard protocols governing forensic 
practice in a given discipline.  And, even when protocols are in place . . . they often 
are vague and not enforced in any meaningful way.133 
History demonstrates that if a lab produces errors (on any scale), it is 
unlikely to affect its accreditation from ASCLD/LAB.  A member of the 
New York Forensic Science Commission criticized ASCLD/LAB for its 
“culture of tolerance for errors stemming from a highly forgiving 
corrections system, some times of major and/or lesser magnitudes, but 
many of which either violate ASCLD/LAB’s ethics guidelines and/or 
standards.”134  Indeed, by its own terms, ASCLD/LAB does not conduct 
 
129 See Justin Peters, The Unsettling, Underregulated World of Crime Labs, SLATE (Jan. 
14, 2013, 3:46 PM), http://goo.gl/YZwUSX. 
130 See id. 
131 Becky Beaupre & Peter Eisler, Crime Lab Crisis: Evidence Backlog Imperils Justice, 
USA TODAY, Aug. 20, 1996, at 1A. 
132 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
133 Id. 
134 See Memorandum from Marvin E. Schechter on ASCLD/LAB and Forensic Lab. 
Accreditation to Members of the N.Y. State Comm’n of Forensic Sci. 23 (Mar. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter Memorandum], available at http://goo.gl/kXZGgs. 
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random inspections of crime labs.135  Labs always get notice of a visit, and 
the lab itself selects the case files for review.136 
Reminiscent of the mortgage industry’s countercyclical diversification 
strategy (which produced the housing bubble), ASCLD offers a wealth of 
services to its member labs, “such as protection from outside inquiry, 
shielding of internal activities and where necessary, especially in the event 
of public condemnation, a spokesperson to buffer the laboratory from media 
inquiry.”137  In other words, when times are bad for a crime lab, ASCLD 
still reaps benefits from member labs.  Crime lab accreditation is a for-
profit business that sorely needs an overhaul, but it likely is not the root 
cause of crime lab scandals. 
What makes forensic error into a full-blown crime lab scandal?  As 
with any scandal that brings down an organization, it usually includes 
repetitive misconduct, a failure to respond, and a culture of tolerance of 
such activity.138  The situations that push an incident from the “problem” 
column to the “scandal” column are varied and diverse.  Examiners may lie 
about test results,139 produce misleading data regarding the reliability of 
their methods,140 or conceal exculpatory evidence.141  Other cases may 
involve “dry-labbing,” where analysts record data for tests that they never 
conducted.142  Protocols may be ignored, forensic scientists may exaggerate 
their credentials or expertise, or tests may be tampered with. 
Whatever the particular problem, it cannot be denied that between 
2005 and 2011, authorities identified fifty significant failures at American 
crime labs.143  These types of problems have led to scandals across the 
 
135 See Justin Peters, Crime Labs Botch Tests All the Time. Who’s Supposed to Make Sure They 
Don’t Screw Up?, SLATE (Jan. 17, 2013, 6:08 PM), http://goo.gl/Z0WRlX (“Laboratory inspections 
are always on notice to a laboratory rather than by surprise . . . .”). 
136 See id. 
137 See Memorandum, supra note 134, at 23. 
138 See Clarke, supra note 2 (“[F]orensic experts and other lab personnel may lie about 
test results, be misleading about the reliability of their methods, and/or cover up test 
outcomes when they are beneficial to the defendant.”). 
139 See id.; see also Denise Lavoie & Erika Niedowski, Annie Dookhan, Chemist in Drug 
Lab Scandal, May Face More Charges, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 29, 2012, 3:05 AM), 
http://goo.gl/qeoyCd (describing the case of a chemist accused of, inter alia, reporting 
positive test results when the test was actually negative, adding cocaine from another sample 
to the negative sample to produce a positive result, and lying about obtaining a master’s 
degree in chemistry from the University of Massachusetts). 
140 See Clarke, supra note 2. 
141 See id. 
142 See Disturbing Trend of Dry Labbing May Be More Common than Originally 
Thought, SENATORS FIRM BLOG (Jan. 12, 2012, 2:35 PM), http://goo.gl/nYDqYC. 
143 See Peters, supra note 135 (citation omitted). 
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nation, resulting in full or partial closures, reorganizations, investigations, 
or firings at city or county crime labs.144  
To highlight some recent examples of flawed testing, for example, 
Detroit in 2008 shut down its crime lab when an audit revealed errors in 
10% of cases.145  In 2010, an audit revealed that technicians in a North 
Carolina lab provided false or misleading results in 190 murder or similarly 
serious cases.146  In 2011, New York shut down a state crime lab after an 
investigation revealed that the lab had engaged in flawed testing for 
MDMA (more commonly known as ecstasy), triggering review of 9,000 
cases.147  Authorities were aware of issues with the crime lab as far back as 
2008.148  
In some cases, analysts have stolen evidence for personal use.149  San 
Francisco crime lab technician Deborah Madden admitted to taking cocaine 
from evidence.150  Police arrested Massachusetts chemist Sonja Farak on 
similar charges related to both cocaine and heroin earlier in 2013.151  The 
need for standard protocol and oversight in state-run crime labs has never 
been more apparent. 
Other analysts tamper with evidence, effectively committing fraud, to 
attain professional recognition.152  Chemist Annie Dookhan (also in 
 
144 For a list of crime lab scandals, see Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 728 n.5.  From 
2005 to 2011, there were at least fifty serious failures at U.S. crime labs, with more than half 
attributable to ASCLD/LAB-certified labs.  See Memorandum, supra note 134, at 14.  Since 
2011, crime lab failures continue to mount.  See Mark Hansen, Crime Labs Under the 
Microscope After a String of Shoddy, Suspect and Fraudulent Results, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 
2013, 5:20 AM), available at http://goo.gl/BSno1q. 
145 See Error-Prone Detroit Crime Lab Shut Down, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2008, 10:34 
PM), http://goo.gl/Ku3Pb2.  In response to the crime lab’s scandal, a Detroit prosecutor said, 
“As prosecutors, we completely rely on the findings of police crime lab experts every day in 
court, and we present this information to our juries . . . .  [W]hen there are failures of this 
magnitude, there is a complete betrayal of trust.  We feel betrayed, as prosecutors.”  Id. 
146 See John Rudolf, Scandal-Plagued North Carolina Crime Lab Sued by Exonerated 
Man, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2011, 11:03 AM), http://goo.gl/7fFo13. 
147 See New York County Crime Lab Closed Down in Probe, REUTERS (Feb. 18, 2011, 
5:16 PM), http://goo.gl/TkCScp. 
148 See STATE OF N.Y. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., INVESTIGATION INTO THE NASSAU 
COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT FORENSIC EVIDENCE BUREAU 105 (2011), available at 
http://goo.gl/HRoKBv. 
149 See, e.g., Second Mistrial Declared in SF Crime Lab Scandal, ABC 7 NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2013), http://goo.gl/GYLIGE. 
150 See id. 
151 See Elizabeth Roman, Chemist Charged; Crime Lab Closed, THE REPUBLICAN, Jan. 
21, 2013, at A1. 
152 See Sally Jacobs, Chasing Renown on a Path Paved with Lies, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 
3, 2013, at A1. 
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Massachusetts) was responsible for the lab’s quality control.153  Authorities 
discovered that she manipulated evidence to obtain false positives.154  
Dookhan was renowned for her “preternatural speed.”155  She analyzed an 
astonishing 500 samples per month, while the average forensic chemist 
makes it through 50 to 150 samples in the same amount of time.156  Her 
supersonic speed, however, was anything but the result of superior skill.  
Dookhan admitted that she cut corners and rarely respected lab protocol.157  
One of Dookhan’s supervisors noted that she “did not seem to use a 
microscope, which is necessary to confirm that a substance is cocaine.”158  
Dookhan further admitted to sprinkling samples submitted for testing with a 
known illegal substance to ensure a positive result as well as testing a small 
percentage of samples and then listing all the remaining samples as 
positive.159  Her misconduct implicated over 30,000 defendants160 and as 
many as 200 cases, which federal officials now must review.161 
Ohio toxicologist James Ferguson lied about his credentials on the 
witness stand hundreds of times.162  Ferguson claimed to have received his 
college degree sixteen years prior to his actual graduation date.163  Ferguson 
discounted the magnitude of the deception in light of his twenty-plus-years’ 
experience.164  One cannot help but wonder what else Ferguson has lied 
about, given his willingness to perjure himself over something he 
characterized as minor.  If he lied about evidence, Ferguson would not be 
alone in committing perjury to bolster prosecutors’ cases.  Michael Hansen 
 
153 See Denise Lavoie, Lawyers Expect Appeals in Mass. Crime Lab Case, BOSTON.COM 
(Sept. 13, 2012), http://goo.gl/wmEAyV. 
154 See Lavoie, supra note 126. 
155 See Peters, supra note 129. 
156 See Lavoie & Niedowski, supra note 139. 
157 See Matt Murphy, Chemist at Center of Drug Lab Case Told Police She “Messed Up 
Bad,” EAGLE TRIB. (Sept. 27, 2012),  http://goo.gl/SbjcvD. 
158 Justin Peters, No National Crime Lab Standards, THE REPUBLICAN (Jan. 20, 2013, 
6:05 PM), http://goo.gl/MIeA5w. 
159 See Lavoie & Niedowski, supra note 139. 
160 See Peters, supra note 158. 
161 Milton J. Valencia et al., Scope of Lab Scandal Widens, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 13, 
2012, at B1. 
162 See Former Toxicologist Sentenced for Lying About Credentials, 10TV.COM (May 18, 
2010, 11:07 AM), http://goo.gl/Kwm1UI.  Dookhan also lied about her credentials at various 
stages of her career.  See Jacobs, supra note 152.  Dookhan at one point claimed to have a 
master’s degree and said she was working toward a doctoral degree from Harvard—neither 
of which was true.  See id.  “She inflated her salary and gave herself grandiose job titles, 
referring to herself in an e-mail as ‘an on-call supervisor for chemical and biological 
terrorism.’”  Id. 
163 See Former Toxicologist Sentenced for Lying About Credentials, supra note 162. 
164 See id. 
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served six years for the murder of his daughter before a judge found that the 
medical examiner, Dr. Michael McGee, testified falsely in Hansen’s trial.165  
The prosecution ultimately dropped the charges.166 
In addition to problems spawning from overt misconduct in crime labs, 
their close connection to law enforcement can result in policies favoring the 
prosecution.  For example, North Carolina’s crime lab recently came under 
fire for a policy of withholding certain results from defense attorneys.167  In 
situations where an initial sample tested positive as blood, the lab would 
withhold any subsequent negative tests—even where the later tests were 
more specific.168  According to an FBI report, the “North Carolina crime lab 
workers omitted, overstated or falsely reported blood evidence over a 16-
year period.”169 
The harms caused by errant crime labs are often compounded by their 
lack of transparency, and some are outright attributable to hiding 
evidence.170  Labs often can be more concerned with reputation than with 
rectifying wrongs (which requires informing defendants of the error(s)).  
These troubling issues exact enormous costs.  When scandals do come to 
light, the criminal justice system must reexamine huge numbers of past 
convictions.171  Annie Dookhan, for example, was directly involved with at 
least one hundred cases in one federal district court alone.172  As many as 
500 or more cases in which she was involved may eventually have to be 
reviewed.173  Ultimately, once state court cases and cases invoking the 
mandatory minimum sentencing requirements based on state convictions 
 
165 See Baran, supra note 127. 
166 See Madeleine Baran, Court Drops Charges Against Man Awaiting Retrial for 
Daughter’s Murder, MINN. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 16, 2011), http://goo.gl/yOOZhZ. 
167 See Giannelli, supra note 128.  Even where there is not a stated policy favoring law 
enforcement, the personal relationships between prosecutors and crime labs can instill a 
sense of loyalty toward the prosecution.  Again, Dookhan’s case is instructive.  A string of e-
mails between the disgraced chemist and state prosecutors revealed that Dookhan saw her 
role as anything but a neutral scientist.  See Andrea Estes & Scott Allen, Chemist Built Up 
Ties to Prosecutors, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 21, 2012, at A1 (“Dookhan . . . viewed herself as 
part of the prosecution team, the e-mails show.  She coached assistant district attorneys on 
trial strategy and told one that her goal was ‘getting [drug dealers] off the streets.’”).  
Another district attorney resigned over a string of suggestive e-mails with Dookhan.  See id. 
168 See Giannelli, supra note 128. 
169 Jessica Hopper, Feds: North Carolina Crime Lab Buried Blood Evidence, ABC NEWS 
(July 18, 2010), http://goo.gl/ejqesP. 
170 See id. 
171 See, e.g., Massachusetts Forensics Chief Tells Legislators Crime Lab Scandals 
Contributed to Two-year Backlog, THE REPUBLICAN (Feb. 20, 2013, 2:03 PM), 
http://goo.gl/9cfSn3. 
172 See Valencia, supra note 161. 
173 See id. 
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are considered, the toll for review is estimated to reach approximately 
34,000 cases.174  In the cases that had been reviewed as of January 2013, 
courts overturned 1,141 convictions where Dookhan handled evidence.175  
The scandal was expected to cost the state more than $40 million.176  Of 
that, the Massachusetts judiciary reportedly requested about $13.6 million 
to deal with the scandal.177  These figures likely exclude the expenses for 
the public defenders needed in many of these cases.178 
At a time when the federal and state governments bemoan declining 
revenues, it seems far more efficient to ensure labs are adequately resourced 
in the first instance than to divert money cleaning up messes after the fact.  
But no matter their gravity, the problems that plague crime labs also exact 
substantial nonmonetary costs.  Not only are internal investigations still 
required to ferret out tainted samples,179 but more importantly, the integrity 
of the criminal justice system is eroded.  These scandals undermine 
society’s faith in a fair and just system.  And, of course, the human cost of 
forensic errors is greatest of all.  There is no way to quantify the pain 
suffered by innocent people incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.  It 
is also well worth remembering that in crimes where there is a victim, every 
innocent person wrongfully convicted means a guilty person is allowed to 
go free. 
While these are but a few in a laundry list of crime lab errors, 
collectively, they underscore the need for greater oversight and increased 
accountability.  The continued failure to address these problems exacts too 
high a toll.  
  
 
174 See Jacobs, supra note 152.  Some estimates run as high as 34,000 tainted cases.  See 
Valencia, supra note 161.  As of February 2013, nearly 300 offenders had been released.  
See Jacobs, supra note 152. 
175 See Peters, supra note 129. 
176 See John R. Ellement, Costs Climb in State Drug Lab Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 
26, 2012, at A1. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. (detailing only that expenses would be used to hire retired judges, assistant clerk 
magistrates, case specialists, law clerks, probation officers, and associate probation officers). 
179 Cf. Roman, supra note 151. 
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II. GROUNDHOG DAY: ATTEMPTS AT REFORMING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
“Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but expecting different 
results.”180 
In the aftermath of the NAS Report and the rise in reporting of crime 
lab errors (whether it is a true increase versus an uptick in reporting is 
subject to debate), it seems that U.S. forensic reform is in its infancy stages.  
While the NAS Report proposed a federal reshaping of forensic science 
services, it was not the first entreaty into reform.  Legislation has tiptoed 
around forensic issues for decades, with little to no success.  Most 
legislation targeted labs rather than forensic science as an industry.  The 
year 2012, however, saw a shift in legislation proposing research, standards, 
and oversight, as opposed to dumping more money into labs. 
A. TREATING SYMPTOMS INSTEAD OF THE CAUSE: THE EARLY YEARS 
OF FORENSIC REFORM 
The abysmal state of crime labs first gained national attention in 1967 
when President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice found that many police labs lacked both 
equipment and expertise.181  During the Nixon Administration, a 1973 
commission echoed many of these same concerns.182  A few years later, the 
National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice garnered 
nationwide media attention with its finding that scores of crime labs were 
underperforming.183  Identifying weaknesses, however, does little to 
actually effectuate change in the absence of funds to accomplish those 
improvements.  This lack of funding is a continuous theme in the 
chronology of forensic reform legislation. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the answer to performance issues seemed to 
be a differential diagnosis of treating symptoms rather than causes by the 
provision of “grants” to fund “assessments.”184  Such an ad-hoc approach 
essentially threw some cash at various problems to incentivize and compel 
improvements.  Of course, that rarely works, and the early attempts at 
reform were just that—attempts. 
 
180 RITA MAE BROWN, SUDDEN DEATH 68 (1983) (reciting a quote often misattributed to 
Albert Einstein, Benjamin Franklin, or Mark Twain). 
181 See Kenneth E. Melson, Embracing the Path Forward: The Journey to Justice 
Continues, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 197, 199 (2010). 
182 See id. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
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B. THE CASH COW: FUNDING LINKED TO DNA TESTING 
Despite the evidence of widespread performance lapses among crime 
labs, Congress largely remained silent on the issue until the use of DNA in 
criminal investigations gained prominence.185  Competing views over DNA 
evidence admissibility led to a 1992 report by the National Academy of 
Sciences.186  A 1996 follow-up report revealed that DNA tests were both 
scientifically valid and reliable.187  The follow-up report, in concert with the 
standards for admissibility established by Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,188 resulted in a rise in the use of DNA in criminal 
trials—and a corresponding uptick in regulating legislation.189 
After the follow-up report, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
joined forces with the Office of Law Enforcement Standards to fund the 
“Forensic Summit: Roadmap to the Year 2000.”190  The summit resulted in 
a report outlining persistent deficiencies in most public crime labs.191  The 
report called for greater standardization, increased research, and quality 
controls in labs.192 
The report notwithstanding, DNA continued to become the so-called 
gold standard in law enforcement and this new reverence—bordering on 
obsession—meant the vast majority of federal funding allocated to crime 
labs was tied to DNA research.193  For example, Congress in 2000 enacted 
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000194 and the Paul 
Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000,195 both 
 
185 Although little federal legislation was introduced in this area, Senator Abraham 
Ribicoff did present a joint resolution designating Wednesday, February 21, 1973, as a day 
of honor celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the American Academy of Forensic 
Sciences.  93 CONG. REC. 425 (1973). 
186 COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DNA 
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE (1992); see also Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic 
Science: The Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control of Scientific Research, 2011 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 53, 58; Melson, supra note 181, at 202. 
187 COMM. ON DNA FORENSIC SCI.: AN UPDATE, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE 
EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE (1996); see also Melson, supra note 181, at 202. 
188 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
189 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 58–59; Melson, supra note 181, at 202–03. 
190 See Melson, supra note 181, at 199. 
191 See id. at 199–200. 
192 See id. 
193 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 58; Melson, supra note 181, at 203. 
194 Pub. L. No. 106-546, 114 Stat. 2726 (2000) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1565 (2012) and 
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
195 Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 10 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  Both Acts were first introduced in 1999.  See DNA Backlog 
Elimination Act, H.R. 3087, 106th Cong. (1999); National Forensic Sciences Improvement 
Act of 1999, S. 1196, 106th Cong. (1999). 
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meant to improve the quality of forensic science services.196  The funding 
mechanisms for DNA testing far outstripped any other allotments, despite 
the fact that DNA testing represents a mere fraction of crime lab work.197  
Moreover, this preference for DNA-related spending did nothing to address 
the persistent issues within crime labs. 
The sad state of forensic labs again gained national attention a few 
years later when President George W. Bush spearheaded the formation of a 
forensic science commission.198  Two mechanisms created in 2004 were 
supposed to carry out the President’s mandate.199  The Consolidated 
Appropriations Act obligated NIJ to provide Congress with a report on  the 
forensic science and medical examiner communities’ needs beyond DNA 
initiatives.200  That same year, the DNA Sexual Assault Justice Act of 2004 
(part of the Justice For All Act) tasked the Attorney General with creating a 
national forensic science Commission, which would identify resource needs 
beyond DNA, in addition to making recommendations, disseminating best 
practices, and researching privacy issues around using DNA samples.201  
Although the bill passed, the commission was never funded.202 
The situation again appeared hopeful with the passage of the Science, 
State, Justice, Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 
2006, which authorized NAS to create a forensic science committee and 
issue a report with findings and recommendations to improve the state of 
forensic science.203  Among the findings previously mentioned, the NAS 
Report noted “great disparities among existing forensic science operations 
in federal, state, and local law enforcement jurisdictions and agencies.”204  
The differences pertained to funding, access to analytical instrumentation, 
the availability of skilled and well-trained personnel, certification, 
accreditation, and oversight.205  In the chronology of forensic reform, the 
NAS Report did much to gain national attention to an issue first 
acknowledged—but not much improved—since the Johnson 
Administration.206 
 
196 See Melson, supra note 181, at 201–02. 
197 See id. at 203. 
198 See id. at 200. 
199 See id. at 200–01. 
200 See id. 
201 See id. at 201; see also 42 U.S.C. § 14136c(b)(1)–(9) (2006). 
202 See Melson, supra note 181, at 201–02. 
203 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1; see also Science, State, Justice, Commerce, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-108, 119 Stat. 2290 (2005). 
204 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 5. 
205 See id. at 6. 
206 See Melson, supra note 181, at 204–05. 
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C. FORENSIC REFORM 3.0: A GRAVEYARD OF GOOD IDEAS 
If the NAS Report’s release can be viewed as a watershed moment, 
then the legislation it spawned might be viewed as the third iteration of 
proposed forensic reform.  A few days prior to the release of the NAS 
Report, Representative Peter Roskam introduced the State and Local 
Criminal Forensic Laboratory Enhancement Act of 2009.207  Despite the 
national attention garnered by the NAS findings, the bill never made it out 
of committee.  President Barack Obama responded by chartering a 
subcommittee on forensic science.208  That subcommittee’s role was to 
make recommendations to achieve the goals the NAS Report outlined.209  
But DNA testing remained the focus of most legislation and received the 
lion’s share of funding through the 111th Congress.210 
Two years later, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Criminal Justice 
and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011.211  The bill, which also died in 
committee,212 would have established an Office of Forensic Science within 
DOJ.213  In 2012 and again in 2013, Representative Eddie Bernice 
introduced legislation to “establish scientific standards and protocols across 
forensic disciplines.”214  The Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013 
(Standards Act)— and its 2012 predecessor215—intends to create “a national 
 
207 H.R. 898, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009).  A previous version was introduced in 2007.  
H.R. 3151, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
208 COMM. ON SCI., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
FORENSIC SCIENCES ([hereinafter CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCE], 
available at http://goo.gl/VYNFqf; see also Paul C. Giannelli, The 2009 NAS Forensic 
Science Report: A Literature Review 2 (Case W. Reserve Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper 
No. 2012-11, 2012), available at http://goo.gl/s1r4sY. 
209 See CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCE, supra note 208, at 1–2.  
The charter for the subcommittee was renewed in March 2012.  See COMM. ON SCI., NAT’L 
SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, CHARTER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FORENSIC SCIENCES, available at 
http://goo.gl/8sulyA. 
210 Aside from the COPS Improvement Act of 2009, H.R. 1139, 111th Cong. (2009), 
which also died in committee, see H.R. 1139 (111th): COPS Improvements Act of 2009, 
GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/kysjEM (last visited Apr. 14, 2014), the majority of legislation 
pertaining to forensics centered on DNA.  See, e.g., Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence 
Registry (SAFER) Act of 2010, H.R. 6085, 111th Cong. (2010) (stating an intention to 
amend the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 and establish a forensic evidence 
registry for sexual assault). 
211 S. 132, 112th Cong. (2011). 
212 See S. 132 (112th): Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, 
GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/olr4GE (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
213 See S. 132 § 101(a). 
214 See Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. (2013); 
Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2012, H.R. 6106, 112th Cong. (2012). 
215 In 2012, Senator John D. “Jay” Rockefeller IV and Representative Eddie Bernice 
introduced companion legislation in the House and the Senate.  See S. 3378, 112th Cong. 
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forensic science research program to improve, expand, and coordinate 
Federal research in the forensic sciences.”216  In addition, the Standards Act 
would establish both a national forensic science coordinating office at the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and a forensic 
science advisory committee.217  Unlike in Senator Leahy’s bill, which 
would place the forensic science office within DOJ, both the NIST director 
and the Attorney General would create the advisory committee, which, in 
turn, would advise DOJ and NIST.218 
Notwithstanding the failed 2012 Standards Act, the resurrected 
Standards Act is notable for its trailblazing approach to tackling forensic 
reform in a manner that prior legislation had not.  The Act aims to fix 
forensic science by encouraging research, adopting standards, and creating 
accreditation requirements.  The legislation, however, suffers from its 
corpulent proportions, despite its ambitious objectives.  Aside from the 
historical failure rate of forensic reforms, the legislation is problematic 
because it would effectively birth a Lernaean Hydra with a multitude of 
agencies, committees, and other entities that border on redundancy and 
grandiosity.  It would create a chaotic assemblage of organizations by 
establishing new entities under the auspices of the existing National Science 
Foundation (NSF) and NIST. 
The NAS Report observed that a lack of quality, peer-reviewed 
forensic science research stymies advancements in the field.  To address 
this deficit, the Standards Act would create a research program, which 
would direct research efforts in the forensic sciences from a variety of 
federal groups.219  In addition to the research program, NIST would house a 
coordinating office, the purpose of which would be to produce a “unified 
Federal research strategy” that identifies and prioritizes research goals 
consistent with the NAS Report and to develop a roadmap to achieve 
them.220  Specifically, the roadmap is intended to establish the criteria that 
the coordinating office would use to assess research progress.  The 
 
(2012).  Senator Rockefeller again introduced the bill before the 113th Congress on Feb. 12, 
2014.  The bill, S. 2022, was reported out of committee on April 9, 2014.  See S. 2022: 
Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2014, GOVTRACK, http://goo.gl/esJ7EK (last visited 
Apr. 14, 2014). 
216 H.R. 3064 § 4(a). 
217 See id. §§ 4, 8.  The prognosis for the bill’s success appeared bleak; a legislation 
tracking website reported that the House bill had a 1% chance of being enacted.  See H.R. 
3064: Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, GOVTRACK,  http://goo.gl/0973CJ (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014).  The Senate bill had a 28% of being enacted.  See S. 2022: Forensic 
Science and Standards Act of 2014, supra note 215. 
218 See H.R. 3064 § 8(b), (d). 
219 See id. § 4(a). 
220 See id. § 4(c)(2). 
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coordinating office also would have oversight responsibility for the research 
program and would submit reports to Congress to identify and make 
recommendations regarding areas of forensic science that would benefit 
from further research. 
The Standards Act also would provide NSF with a research grant 
program at an operating budget of $34 million for fiscal year 2014, 
increasing by $3 million each year until 2018.221  On top of the tremendous 
budget allocation, the most ambitious aspect of the Standards Act would be 
the creation of one or more new forensic science research centers under the 
auspices of the NSF.222  The Standards Act would establish the research 
center for four specific purposes: (1) to develop a plan to unify forensic 
research across federal agencies; (2) to “build relationships between 
forensic science practitioners and members of the research community”; (3) 
to promote education of individuals with the aim of creating leaders in the 
forensic sciences; and (4) to disseminate their work.223 
Collecting a few more federal entities to add to the convention-like 
atmosphere, the Standards Act provides for additional forensic roles within 
the confines of the NIST.  Responding to the NAS Report’s concerns about 
disparate forensic science results, the Standards Act requires NIST to 
develop “forensic science standards to enhance the validity and reliability of 
forensic science activities.”224  Such activities encompass uniform 
measurements and criteria both for the methods and tools forensic scientists 
use.225  Further, the Standards Act would saddle NIST with standardizing 
the terminology forensic scientists use in their reports, providing for 
interoperability of forensic science databases, testing and validating existing 
standards, and independently validating “forensic science measurements 
and methods.”226 
To add to the confusion, the Standards Act would establish an advisory 
committee under the supervision of NIST, the NSF, and the Attorney 
General to counsel federal departments, agencies, and offices.  The 
committee would consist of an interdisciplinary array of scientists and 
lawyers.  To achieve these ends, the NIST director would be given free rein 
to establish working groups to “identify gaps, areas of need, and 
opportunities for standards development.”227  The Standards Act would 
 
221 See id. § 5. 
222 See id. § 5(c)(1). 
223 See id. 
224 Id. § 7(a)(1)(B). 
225 See id. 
226 See id. § 7(a)(1)(B), (C). 
227 See id. § 7(b)(1). 
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allocate NIST a budget of $5 million for 2014, $12 million for 2015, $20 
million for 2016, $27 million for 2017, and $35 million for 2018.228 
The final piece to this forensic puzzle concerns the Attorney General’s 
role.  The Standards Act would provide the Attorney General with 
lackluster enforcement powers.  While the Act requires the Attorney 
General to enforce forensic standards developed under the Act at the federal 
level, the Attorney General is relegated in nonfederal labs to “encouraging” 
and “promoting” powers that (in a better translation) merely suggest that 
nonfederal labs adopt the standards and promote certification and 
accreditation criteria.229  Since the Standards Act effectively holds the cash 
hostage at the federal level, all other labs would have little incentive to 
implement any new standards or accreditation measures.  Simply put, the 
Act lacks any “buy in” for the little (i.e., nonfederal) guys. 
On the one hand, the Standards Act’s broad agenda would accomplish 
several things.  It identifies the need for research, showcases the utility of 
research centers, and underscores the basic requirement of standards.  
Unfortunately, similar earlier versions of the bill died in committee, so this 
iteration may become another obituary in the history of forensic reform, 
likely doomed by a lack of political capital and a steep price tag.  
Consequently, the Act may very well be a classic example of an unrealistic 
wish list that no one can afford.  
In a post-script to the demise of the Forensic Science Standards Act of 
2012, Senator Leahy indicated his commitment to forensic reform in an 
early 2013 speech.230  This afterthought, at the very least, dovetailed into a 
development where, pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, DOJ 
announced that it would partner with NIST to create a National 
Commission on Forensic Science.231  The role that commission will play in 
the ongoing debate on forensic reform remains unclear. 
III. TOO BIG TO FAIL: OBSTACLES TO FEDERAL FORENSIC OVERSIGHT 
Against the backdrop of failed forensic legislation, a myriad of 
forensic standards remain across the multitude of forensic science 
disciplines.232  The NAS Report concluded that these problems could “only 
 
228 See id. § 7(c). 
229 See id. § 9(1), (2); S. 3378, 112th Cong. § 9(1)(B) (2012). 
230 Senator Patrick Leahy, The Agenda of the Senate Judiciary Committee for the 113th 
Congress, Address at Georgetown University Law Center (Jan. 16, 2013), available at 
http://goo.gl/j1UsTR. 
231 Notice of Establishment of the National Commission on Forensic Science and 
Solicitation of Applications for Commission Membership, 78 Fed. Reg. 12355 (Feb. 22, 2013). 
232 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 14 (“The forensic science disciplines currently are 
an assortment of methods and practices used in both the public and private arenas.”). 
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be addressed by a national commitment to overhaul the current structure 
that supports the forensic science community in this country.”233  After the 
Report’s release, other scholars and forensic science experts called for a 
national entity or entities to provide national forensic science standards,234 
but consensus on how to best accomplish this has remained an uncatchable 
shadow.  Indeed, many forensic science practitioners disagreed with a 
federal entity running the show.235  Consequently, the Standards Act 
highlights the problem of too many ideas floating about to translate into one 
workable system. 
Even assuming a slight consensus that a federal entity should (or 
could) promulgate national forensic standards,236 two questions remain: (1) 
whether the federal government has the power to effectively create and 
enforce such standards; and (2) if so, how such a program should operate. 
This Part offers attempts to answer both.  First, the federal government 
likely has the power to regulate at least parts of the forensic science 
community, but it would need support from state and federal courts to 
enforce the standards it promulgates.  Second, I submit that even with 
judicial support and the express authority to cram federal legislation down 
the state pipeline, resistance would be stiff, and the requisite buy-in from 
crime labs and forensic organizations is lacking. 
A. FEDERAL POWER TO MANDATE STANDARDS 
Congress could attempt to mandate federal standards on its own.  
Under Gonzales v. Raich, Congress has the power to regulate even 
noneconomic goods if it does so as part of a commercial regulatory 
scheme.237  This could give Congress some latitude to regulate parts of the 
 
233 See id. at xx. 
234 See Gabel & Champion, supra note 29, at 26–27 (arguing that a federal agency 
should be created to regulate forensic services nationwide now, before states establish their 
own schemes); Melson, supra note 181, at 207 (arguing in favor of a national forensic 
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235 See, e.g., Ryan M. Goldstein, Note, Improving Forensic Science Through State 
Oversight, 90 TEX. L. REV. 225, 234 (2011) (arguing that stronger state-level oversight 
would help with current problems in forensic sciences). 
236 Several national forensic science organizations already exist in different disciplines, 
including the American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), the American Society of 
Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), the International Association for Identification (IAI), 
and the National Association of Medical Examiners (NAME).  See STATUS AND NEEDS, 
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note 1, at 16. 
237 See 545 U.S. 1, 23 (2005). 
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forensic science community.  For example, Congress might choose to 
regulate instruments used in forensic science analysis, because it would 
have a rational basis for regulating their creation and use.  But the power to 
regulate commerce would have its limits,238 especially related to research.  
One of the most critical needs in the forensic science community is for 
research into standards and protocols.239  Congress could perhaps fund its 
own research into these areas (as it suggests in Forensic Science Standards 
Act), but mandating the direction of university-level research likely would 
be beyond the scope of Congress’s power, even if it were politically 
feasible. 
Congress is also limited either politically or constitutionally in what it 
can do to mandate what state and local courts admit as evidence.240  Even if 
Congress could significantly affect the landscape of the forensic science 
community through mandates, much of its effect would diminish if state 
and local courts did not adopt the same standards. 
B. FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT CREATES NATIONAL STANDARDS 
Enforcing national standards in federal courts is a direct method of 
encouraging their adoption in the states.  To make this happen, a federal 
forensic science agency first could consider the current Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE) and advise Congress on changes needed for properly 
implementing national standards in federal courts.  Next, mandating these 
modifications as forensic evidence standards in federal courts would 
provide for significant, positive changes.  Terminology, reporting, 
operational principles, and other processes could be standardized in federal 
court, providing for more efficiency, less juror confusion, more accurate 
outcomes, and less time spent litigating.  Further, many of the federal-level 
changes would positively impact standards at state and local levels, because 
some state and local agencies rely on the same labs as federal law 
enforcement agencies.241  Thus, changing standards in the shared labs 
would benefit agencies at all levels.  Finally, federally mandating crime lab 
 
238 I make no guarantees regarding the ultimate constitutionality of such regulations.  That 
debate is better saved for a far-off day when the passage of such legislation appears realistic. 
239 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15. 
240 See Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Federal Regulation of State Court Procedures, 110 YALE 
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241 See, e.g., Crime Laboratory, NEBRASKA.GOV, http://goo.gl/awzdMy (last visited Apr. 
14, 2014) (“The Division . . . serves all local, county, state, federal and military law 
enforcement agencies in Nebraska.”); Rhode Island State Crime Laboratory, UNIV. R.I., 
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technician certifications as part of this process would result in an increased 
demand for colleges and universities to offer courses for students to pursue 
those certifications.  The resulting increase in educational opportunities 
would allow more state and local forensic scientists to receive the same 
education as their federal counterparts. 
But enforcing evidentiary standards in federal courts would only be the 
first positive step in achieving national forensic standards.  Perhaps some 
states would adopt the FRE changes, but not all states base their rules of 
evidence on the FRE;242 thus the changes may not receive universal, or even 
significant, adoption.  Moreover, states’ lack of resources would also slow 
adoption.  As it is, local and state forensic science services are underfunded 
and backlogged.243  Many labs have neither the time nor the funds to 
transition to a uniform, FRE-guided system.  Finally, implementing national 
evidence standards would also create political resistance in many states, 
especially under current economic conditions. 
Without an ability to truly mandate the same changes at the state and 
local level, imposing new forensic evidence standards would only get part 
of the way toward a truly national system of forensic science.  Moreover, 
adopting and applying standards and practices rooted in federal origins 
takes time.244  This FRE approach would have to be combined with another 
approach, such as tying federal funding for forensic science initiatives to the 
adoption of national standards. 
C. TIE FEDERAL FUNDS TO ADOPTION OF REGULATIONS 
1. Constitutionality of Tying Federal Funding to Related Programs 
Tying federal funding to the adoption of standards is another, less 
direct method to create effective national forensic standards.  Congress 
employed this method before to coerce states to adopt a drinking age of 
twenty-one.  Passed in 1984, the National Minimum Drinking Age Act 
 
242 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE T-1 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2013) (“Forty-two states . . . have 
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(Jan. 17, 2010, 8:39 PM), http://goo.gl/ka3xCc (“On average, it takes state experts more than 
six months to complete ballistics tests in cases involving firearms.”); Melissa Maynard, 
Collection of DNA Evidence Grows, As Does Need for Federal Funding, WASH. POST, Mar. 
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Ct. 1958, 1977 (2013) (asserting that technological advances are substantially reducing 
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244 By way of example, Georgia changed its rules of evidence in May 2011 to reflect the 
federal rules.  H.B. 24, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2011).  The new rules did not go 
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provided that any state that lowered its drinking age below twenty-one lost 
10% of its federal highway funding.245 
South Dakota challenged the National Minimum Drinking Age Act’s 
constitutionality in South Dakota v. Dole.246  The Court upheld the Act but 
laid out four general restrictions on Congress’s spending power: (1) any 
such “exercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of the general 
welfare”;247 (2) Congress must make its conditions on federal funds 
unambiguous; (3) any condition might be illegitimate if it does not relate 
“‘to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs’”; and (4) 
other constitutional provisions might create independent bars to Congress’s 
conditional grants.248  Thus, any attempt to coerce states to adopt national 
forensic standards must fall within these restrictions.249 
Utilizing federal spending power to create national forensic standards 
would likely pass constitutional muster.  First, a national forensic standards 
program would be in pursuit of the general welfare.  National forensic 
standards would help place factually guilty criminals in jail sooner, 
providing for safer communities.  Relatedly, wrongful convictions would 
decrease, resulting in fewer resources wasted litigating and fewer innocent 
citizens behind bars.  Providing clear job paths in the forensic sciences 
would also streamline educational processes and attract more people to the 
field.  Next, Congress could easily meet the second restriction by 
unambiguously writing into the legislation the conditions for federal 
funding.  Further, the third restriction—ensuring that the condition relates 
to the particular federal interest—would also be easily met.  In Dole, the 
condition placed on federal highway funds was that states keep the legal 
drinking age at or above twenty-one, and the Court found that this 
requirement directly related to safe interstate travel, the main purpose of 
highway funding.250  Here, the condition would be to follow a national 
forensic standards program, which is directly related to creating national 
forensic standards, the main purpose of the funding.  Finally, none of the 
many components of the program would likely violate other constitutional 
provisions.  Thus, satisfying all four restrictions, a program that tied federal 
funds to state participation would be a constitutionally viable option to 
encourage states to adopt national forensic standards. 
 
245 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
246 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 203 (1987). 
247 Id. at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
248 Id. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) 
(plurality opinion)). 
249 Each portion of a national forensic standards program could theoretically be challenged, 
but the analysis here covers only a national forensic standards program as a whole. 
250 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. 
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2. Obstacles in Using Federal Funds to Encourage Adoption of Standards 
Because tying federal funding to national forensic standards might be 
constitutionally permissible does not mean that it is the best or easiest 
method for encouraging their adoption.  There are also practical challenges, 
such as getting states to act and securing a source of funding.  Examining 
similar programs already in place can provide guidance. 
a. Adoption 
The strength of a national forensic standards program would come 
from it being truly national, which would (eventually) require every state to 
adopt the standards.  To this end, federal funding can be a powerful 
motivator.  For example, after the National Minimum Drinking Age Act 
tied only 5% of a state’s federal highway funds to the drinking age 
requirement, all fifty states complied with the condition.251  Perhaps this 
quick compliance based on such a relatively small percentage of funding is 
simply evidence that states can only be enticed to make decisions they were 
not far from making in the first place.  Even granting this assumption, there 
is little evidence of strong moral resistance among the states to the idea of 
national forensic standards. 
Greater resistance to a federal funding program might come from 
states that will not benefit from it.  It is unlikely that federal funding could 
cover every state’s forensic science expenditures, especially when the initial 
costs to raise a state’s forensic standards to a proposed federal level are 
great.  Thus, some states will lack resources to effectively implement 
national forensic requirements, even with federal funding. 
To close the gap between current state forensic science standards and 
the standards a national program would require, multiple methods of fund 
distributions are necessary.  Initially, federal funding directed at elevating 
current state forensic standards could be offered, followed by a separate 
source of funding to maintain that standard.  This would help states 
overcome the burden of eliminating the disparities between their current 
standards and those that would be required under a federal system.  
Assuming adoption could be achieved through funding, discovering a 
means to pay for that funding could still present a problem. 
 
251 KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 166 (17th 
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b. Source of Funds 
In light of the current economic conditions and approaches to federal 
spending,252 finding significant sources of funds to support a national 
forensic standards program would be challenging.  Arguments for such a 
program should include both any cost savings and any economic stimulus 
such a program would create. 
As discussed, national standards would address the current forensic 
systems’ inefficiencies.  Erroneous criminal convictions cost the country 
both in terms of what wrongly convicted defendants could otherwise 
provide for society and the damage criminals who escape conviction can 
cause.  Moreover, the myriad of inconsistent forensic standards across the 
country prevents labs, investigators, prosecutors, and defense attorneys 
from seeking out more efficient and effective methods for resolving 
frequently litigated forensic issues.  Consistent national standards would 
streamline forensic processes. 
A national forensic standards program would also provide economic 
stimulus.  Research funding would advance our universities and research 
institutions.  A clear (and nationally consistent) career path for forensic 
scientists would draw more students to STEM subjects and to the forensic 
science field.  Focusing the nation’s forensic science standards on common 
goals might also create new industries and allow the United States to 
become a leader in others.   
c. Previous Attempts 
In addition to considering the potential funding and adoption 
problems, a survey of previous attempts to develop a national set of forensic 
standards can provide guidance for a new endeavor.  As previously 
mentioned, Congress has already tied  federal funds to some forensic 
science initiatives.  From 2000 to 2004, Congress created and expanded the 
aforementioned Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Act.253  The 
Coverdell Act “awards grants to states and units of local government to 
help improve the quality and timeliness of forensic science and medical 
examiner services.”254  In 2009 and 2010, roughly $23 million and $33 
 
252 President Obama’s budget mentions making “tough choices to cut spending” and 
needing to “put our Nation’s finances in order.”  OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 
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million were given out in Coverdell grants, respectively, but that amount 
fell to less than $11 million in 2012.255 
The Coverdell grant program has faced two problems that any national 
forensics standards program would need to overcome.  The first is its total 
funding level, which would need to be significantly higher than the 
Coverdell program’s $33 million high point to initiate and ultimately 
maintain a national forensic standards program.  The second problem is the 
Coverdell system’s administration.  An Innocence Project report found 
enough significant problems with the program’s administration to call into 
question whether it even ensured that the law’s most basic requirements 
were being followed.256  Again, history does not bode well for establishing 
a federal forensic agency that has authority over nonfederal forensic 
stakeholders. 
D. THE BUY-IN: RESISTANCE TO REFORM 
Assuming that a more tempered, fiscally palatable, and constitutional 
approach to a federal forensic agency is possible, the problem of “buy-in” 
still has not been overcome.  Stakeholders across all levels of the forensic 
process would need to commit to reform.  Given that the forensic process—
from crime to conviction—requires coordination and communication across 
the complexity of the criminal justice system, it functions much like a 
nervous system.  And just as a nervous system is vulnerable to malfunction 
in multiple ways, so too is the forensic process.  Consequently, absent 
choreographed interplay of all the individuals in the forensic nervous 
system, forensic reform (let alone establishing a federal agency) would lack 
the necessary support.  The system requires integrity and the cooperation of 
all parties.  It is about more than just ironing out kinks in the circuit. 
Immediately after the NAS Report’s release, several specialty forensic 
organizations promulgated rapid-fire statements condemning the report, the 
representative groups of the NAS committee, and the methodology that led 
to their long list of recommendations.  Rather than responding with reason 
and authority, the organizations resorted to defensive rhetoric.  In an 
obvious attempt at damage control, the organizations demonstrated that any 
attempt to overhaul forensic science would be met with swift and strong 
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resistance.257  Indeed, if these groups possessed the lobbying prowess of, for 
example, the National Rifle Association, they probably would have been 
able to get legislation moving in the opposite direction and perhaps would 
have sought to declare forensic reform unconstitutional. 
As already noted, the NAS Report singled out fingerprinting and 
firearms analysis, among a host of others.  With regard to fingerprinting’s 
ACE-V method, the Report concluded that the framework lacked 
specificity, failed to prevent bias, and could not produce repeatable and 
reliable results.  In sum, the Report found that the process “does not 
guarantee that two analysts following it will obtain the same results.”258  In 
response, the International Association of Identification (IAI) issued a 
statement, noting that “[t]here is no research to suggest that properly trained 
and professionally guided examiners cannot reliably identify whole or 
partial fingerprint impressions to the person from whom they originated.”259 
To a lesser degree, this sentiment was echoed by the Association of 
Firearm and Toolmark Examiners (AFTE).  The AFTE agreed that 
deficiencies exist in the discipline, but maintained that the “NAS painted an 
incomplete and inaccurate portrait of the field of firearm and toolmark 
identification using a very broad brush, and in doing did not consider the 
appropriate scientific principles on which our discipline is founded.”260  
These examples are but two in a larger pool of responses focused on 
maintaining the status quo,261 and they reveal reluctance, resistance, or even 
resentment towards forensic reform.  If those attitudes continue, forensic 
reform—whether federally mandated or not—will fail. 
To be fair, in the years since the NAS Report, various forensic 
organizations have refined their knee-jerk responses somewhat.  While 
perhaps falling short of love letters, they acknowledge at least an interest in 
performing research to establish statistical measures for the evidence.  In 
fact, the IAI’s Standardization II Committee more recently recommended 
that the organization: 
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create a Standing Committee on probability theory and statistics as it relates to the 
forensic disciplines represented by the IAI.  Their charge would be to assist the 
Science and Practice Committee in the acceptance and implementation of probability 
modeling and to liaise with various entities such as the FBI’s Biometric Center of 
Excellence, National Institute of Science and Technology, National Institute of 
Justice, National Academy of Sciences and the European Network of Forensic 
Science Institutes.262 
The Committee also recommended that the IAI support the “pursuit of a 
single internationally accepted examination methodology and standard for 
conclusions.”263  Of course, one committee rarely speaks for the body as a 
whole, so while there is some acquiescence to forensic reform, it is also 
clear that centralized, unilateral reform may disenfranchise the very groups 
that are needed to effectuate that change.  But, as the following Part 
demonstrates, there are other ways to accomplish a paradigm shift in 
forensic science. 
IV. ORGANIC CHEMISTRY: REFORMING FORENSIC SCIENCE FROM ITS BASE 
Given the political stalemate that likely will persist, we need to shift 
the dynamic of forensic analysis from static observation to active 
experimentation.  This transition demands not only cooperation between 
law enforcement and the legal system but must also involve scientists and 
universities as active participants in the everyday world of forensic 
evidence.  It also requires crime labs to take accountability and ownership 
of their shortcomings.  Together, this would facilitate the implementation of 
science-based practices and policies and would change the fundamental 
relationship between research and practice, which often exist on opposite 
sides of a deep chasm. 
While creating a single, central entity to accomplish such cooperation 
would be optimal, it also is an elusive (and perhaps imaginary) ambition at 
this point.  Accepting the practical obstacles for what they are and starting 
at the bottom “on the frontline” of forensic science by creating research 
partnerships is a more realistic and workable model.  Research partnerships 
would accomplish what a federal entity perhaps could not: marrying 
underlying theories of forensic science with its application and practice.  
These partnerships—whether with universities or research nonprofits—
would facilitate the simultaneous, informed development of forensic 
science standards and frameworks in collaboration with crime labs where 
actual casework is performed.  By comparison, divorcing research from the 
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practice of forensic science would have a chilling effect, because it would 
become suspect to the very entities that it would be thrust upon—the 
forensic labs.  Thus, making crime labs part of the solution instead of telling 
them that they are the problem would go a long way toward reforming 
forensic science.  Part IV.A first explains how research partnerships could 
advance areas requiring necessary improvements, including by promoting 
research and by developing standards for methodology and terminology.  
Part IV.B then discusses secondary benefits that could be attained.  
A. APPRECIATING THE BIG PICTURE: NONNEGOTIABLES 
Until recently, most practice-driven studies of forensic techniques 
were based on very simplistic methodologies and focused on 
implementation rather than design.264  These studies often failed to address 
key issues around technique repeatability or, equally crucial, fallibility. 
After assessing whether the methodology worked, forensic labs then 
diffused techniques more widely within their agencies and across agencies, 
without adequately researching the real effects.  Some inroads into the 
process have been accomplished, but it could hardly be called a trend 
toward transparency.  Rather, the framework for testing forensic techniques 
has traditionally been more of a symbolic activity than a real scientific 
activity.  By developing a transparent interpretational architecture, we may 
reconstruct the forensic science technique process and understand why 
issues, such as reproducibility, are not present in each and every case. 
Given the increase in requests for forensic analysis in everything from 
murder cases to low-level property crimes, it is becoming progressively 
more expensive for crime labs to carry out the necessary work.  But without 
scientific bases to legitimize the value and reliability of their analyses, it is 
likely that forensic evidence will continue to not only be vulnerable but also 
untrustworthy.  When crime labs see little value in university-level research, 
there will also be few serious scientists who are interested in or know about 
forensic sciences. 
As compared to other public services, such as health and education, 
forensic science receives little research funding outside of that provided for 
DNA technology, meaning (Hollywood glamour aside) that young scientists 
are unlikely to see forensics as an area of study with promise.265  This is a 
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vicious cycle: the lack of priority accorded to forensic science translates 
into limited investment and rewards (i.e., grant funding) and, in turn, into 
limited opportunities and career prospects for scientists interested in 
developing the research culture. 
Perhaps the most important cost of the present state of forensic science 
is that there will be a growing fissure between scientific research and 
forensic practice.  Forensic practice has had little scientific guidance to 
date, and though much more is known today than even just a decade ago, 
what is most striking is that we know little about what makes forensic 
practices effective—what works, in what contexts, and at what cost. 
In a system that habitually pairs crime labs with law enforcement 
agencies, it makes no sense to have budgets that fail to allocate for forensic 
science research and development.  One might argue that the cost of 
research should not be borne on a local level, but it seems unreasonable that 
larger crime labs (which are, in some respects, like large medical centers) 
do not see themselves as responsible for advancing and testing their 
forensic practices in a scientific framework.  The following Section 
identifies the need for research before delving into means of accomplishing 
that research through partnerships. 
1. The Need for Research: From Butchers to Bakers 
The NAS Report characterized the current research situation in 
forensic science as a “serious problem.”266  The Report noted that although 
some research has been conducted in some disciplines, “the simple reality is 
that the interpretation of forensic evidence is not always based on scientific 
studies to determine its validity.”267  Many forensic evidence disciplines 
lack significant peer-reviewed research of the scientific bases for and 
validity of the forensic methods.268  Fingerprint identification is one such 
discipline where “sufficient data on the diagnosticity and reliability . . . do 
not exist.”269 
Unfortunately, not much has changed since the Report revealed this 
dearth of research.  As Paul Giannelli notes, the very government agencies 
tasked with researching forensic sciences have manipulated their craft in the 
areas of DNA profiling, fingerprint analysis, and bullet lead analysis.270  
 
WILLIAMS & PAUL JOHNSON, GENETIC POLICING: THE USE OF DNA IN CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATIONS 115–16 (2008). 
266 NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8. 
267 Id. 
268 See id. 
269 Koehler, supra note 52, at 1079. 
270 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 57. 
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These scholarly shortcomings, he posits, may be attributable to tight 
budgets and a lack of training.271  The profound—and potentially 
dangerous—absence of peer-reviewed research mutes courts’ abilities to act 
as gatekeepers.  Instead of properly keeping from the jury misleading 
“expert evidence,” the only mechanism by which to undo the harm caused 
is by cross-examining the “expert.”272  Instead of being able to easily 
identify the shortcomings of self-proclaimed “experts” and properly exclude 
them from the witness stand, jurors’ misconceptions about the reliability of 
certain forensic analysis procedures is further strengthened by testimony 
from “pseudo-experts who . . . appear legitimate.”273 
Research, therefore, must become an important part of forensic 
science’s infrastructure.  Crime labs have the ability to create research 
partnerships with outside entities.  In the same sense that the teaching 
hospital model combines patient care, professional training, and medical 
research, we must bring universities and other research partners into crime 
labs.  New partnerships between forensic scientists and forensic science 
researchers can build upon the university medical center model.274  
Fostering these relationships may ultimately prove more fruitful than the 
federal funding scramble.  Examiner training and experiences remain 
valuable for the assessment of tolerance and rarity; however, examiners 
cannot reliably demonstrate this in a transparent manner.  Furthermore, 
examiners’ cognitive abilities cannot outperform the computational power 
of computers.  These tools can be utilized to provide measures of whether 
the features, as observed and annotated, are within expected tolerance and 
whether the rarity of the evidence is one that warrants a decision of 
“suitability” or “identification” (when all features correspond in the 
comparison).  While these tools are not readily available (as they are 
currently being researched and developed), once they have been 
appropriately researched and validated, then those technologies may 
support the decisionmaking processes inherent in forensic analysis.  At 
 
271 See Paul C. Giannelli, Forensic Science: Why No Research?, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
503, 517 (2010).  Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts, observed how unsatisfactory training makes its way from the crime lab to the 
witness stand.  557 U.S. 305, 318 (2009).  He noted that forensic science is not perfect but 
that some of its shortfalls could be remedied through cross-examination.  See id.  Justice 
Scalia noted that, for example, an analyst with insufficient training could be confronted on 
the stand.  See id. at 320.  He did not take note of the fact that a jury would not likely be 
persuaded to discredit that expert’s testimony when such insufficient training is the norm. 
272 See Simon A. Cole, Where the Rubber Meets the Road: Thinking About Expert 
Evidence as Expert Testimony, 52 VILL. L. REV. 803, 805 (2007). 
273 Id. at 807. 
274 See Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 767–68. 
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bottom, science must become a natural part of forensics and forensics must 
become based in science. 
2. Creating the Research Partnerships 
What some might call hard sciences—such as the sciences of 
engineering and biotechnology—have been slow to gain a foothold in 
forensic research.  Because of this, an evidence-based model, in which 
standards are developed with clear scientific criteria, is lacking.  Unlike 
institutions dedicated to the hard sciences, crime labs do not, on the whole, 
encourage their scientific staff to publish in scientific journals on 
criminalistics.  Instead, publication is generally discouraged, because it 
might negatively affect the lab or the law enforcement agency to which it is 
linked.275 
Science, in this sense, is not a part of many crime labs—whether large 
or small.  As a result, the scientific quality of forensic analysis is often 
relatively low.  Crime labs do not have the resources to develop research 
while also managing caseloads, tight budgets, and backlogs.  In addition, 
many of the issues with forensic science research stem from crime labs’ 
lack of independence: any facility with a research capacity is often housed 
within the law enforcement agencies that exacerbate the problems with 
forensic methodologies, analysis, and reporting.276  The NAS Report 
concluded that these law enforcement agencies are “‘too wedded’ to the 
status quo” to make good candidates for carrying out a research agenda.277  
Indeed, the creation of university–crime lab partnerships to conduct forensic 
research may be the only way to bolster scholarly research in the field. 
Admittedly, this structure requires legwork by both crime labs and the 
research partners they identify.  Memorandums of understanding, a bit of 
politicking, and some compromises would be needed all the way around.  
Starting small and incrementally tempering the partnership through 
collaboration would be a step in the right direction.  Thus, the research 
partnerships might choose to focus their efforts on more specific and 
narrow subject matter with directed research, establishing forensic 
frameworks, or standardizing terminology and reporting. 
 
275 See generally James R. Acker & Catherine L. Bonventre, Protecting the Innocent in 
New York: Moving Beyond Changing Only Their Names, 73 ALB. L. REV. 1245 (2010) 
(addressing the general failure of crime labs to compile data and report methodology for 
analysis by research scholars charting lab errors). 
276 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 56–57. 
277 See id. at 56 (quoting NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 18). 
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3. Directed Research Efforts 
One of the most pressing needs in nearly every forensic science 
discipline is more research.278  Outside DNA analysis, very little research 
has been carried out.  But more consensus in other disciplines is needed 
regarding the merits of the science, the protocols that should be used, and 
the standards and terminology that should be adopted.279  Both areas of 
forensic practice—lab-based disciplines and disciplines based on the 
subjective observations of experts—likely would require different research 
approaches. 
Lab-based disciplines necessitate traditional, peer-reviewed research, 
which is common in other disciplines outside of forensic sciences.280  
Educational institutions often perform such research.  Thus, a research 
partnership intent on advancing forensic science in the lab-based disciplines 
will need to encourage (which typically means fund) research at the 
university level.  To promote this research, crime labs and universities 
would need to establish strong ties.281  For example, issues regarding 
transparency could be addressed by clearly documenting and defining 
observations and interpretations based on the evidence.  Other issues, 
primarily related to assessing the weight or strength of evidence (e.g., 
“suitability,” “tolerance,” and “rarity”) will require considerable support 
from both the practitioner and research communities to determine the most 
appropriate course of action. 
Disciplines that involve subjective review of expert observations 
particularly suffer from a lack of a research culture.282  Judges, for example,  
are prone to inferring “scientific validity from the fact of longstanding 
use.”283  Given the fact that these methods are often accepted in the 
courtroom at first blush, developing a research culture for the more 
subjective forensic disciplines will not only require traditional, peer-
reviewed research at the university level but also a focus on the scientists’ 
 
278 As Judge Harry T. Edwards, cochair of the NAS Report committee and a judge on the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, stated, “[T]he most important part of our 
committee’s report is its call for real science to support the forensic disciplines.”  Harry T. 
Edwards, The National Academy of Sciences Report on Forensic Sciences: What It Means 
for the Bench and Bar, 51 JURIMETRICS 1, 9 (2010). 
279 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (“The broader research community generally is 
not engaged in conducting research relevant to advancing the forensic science disciplines.”). 
280 Id. at 8. 
281 See id. at 16 (“Governance . . . must be well connected with the Nation’s scientific 
research base to effect meaningful advances in forensic science practices.”). 
282 See Mnookin et al., supra note 54, at 744. 
283 Id. at 747. 
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role in evidence analysis.284  Analysis in disciplines such as fingerprints, 
toolmarks, and ballistics often comes down to a scientist’s experience and 
“eye” for the evidence.  Very little research has been directed towards 
scientist biases in this process and how the scientist’s role as a possibly 
partial observer can be limited.285  Some scholars suggest moving away 
from the “eyeballing” method altogether by ensuring that an emphasis on 
empirical data drives the reform of these fields.286 
4. Adopting Standards and Forensic Frameworks 
The lack of standards has far-reaching effects.  The NAS Report noted 
that forensic science training programs have no uniform standards, leading 
to uncertainty in both the quality and relevance of the programs.287  
Moreover, without first establishing a cohesive relationship between 
forensic research and forensic practice, the system will continue to produce 
preventable errors, employ outdated procedures and methodologies, and 
struggle with internal disputes as to where the line between acceptable and 
unacceptable procedures is to be drawn.  As a result, until standards are 
established, there can be no consistent method for granting crime lab 
accreditation.288 
The forensic sciences should look to the medical community and 
university research hospitals as a model.  By way of example, consider a 
cancer researcher working side-by-side with an oncologist.  The oncologist 
practices medicine and the researcher documents, analyzes, and works on 
ways to improve treatments.  The research is then shared across hospitals 
and universities and published in medical journals.  The entire medical 
community then advances by better understanding the disease and, 
accordingly, adjusting the standards for treatment. 
A similar partnership would be a perfect fit for forensic science and 
would meet key benchmarks for setting research standards under the 
Standards Act.  First, it would establish standards for measurements, 
analysis, and interpretation.289  This standardization would ensure that labs 
are uniform in their determination of what results mean.  Second, it creates 
 
284 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 8 (“A body of research is required to establish the 
limits and measures of performance and to address the impact of sources of variability and 
potential bias.”). 
285 See id. 
286 See generally Mnookin et al., supra note 54. 
287 See id. at 237. 
288 See id. at 25 (“Standards should reflect best practices and serve as accreditation tools 
for laboratories and as guides for the education, training, and certification of professionals.”). 
289 See Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013, H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. 
§ 7(a)(1)(B)(i) (2013). 
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standardization in the products and services forensic scientists supply to the 
criminal justice system.290  Such standardization would address the 
disparities that arise when labs on the whole employ different 
methodologies, vary in their protocols, or maintain dissimilar reporting 
requirements.291  By addressing those disparities, the forensic science 
community would have a clear foundation—one recognized at the macro 
level—for establishing standards for crime lab accreditation.  Finally, the 
resulting standards would accomplish the same objectives in the forensic 
science community that standards have accomplished in the medical 
community: quality assurance, ethics policing, reducing errors, and 
inspiring faith from the community it serves.   
I should underscore that researching and developing standards cannot 
occur overnight.  Relationships between crime labs and universities would 
take time to establish, and agreeing on a specific research agenda is no easy 
task.  There would be setbacks, frustrations, and unforeseen issues that 
develop.  Moreover, research, standards and empirical studies for specific 
forensic sciences would not be a one-size-fits-all fix to forensic sciences 
generally.  The frameworks of each individual discipline require different 
methodologies and, indeed, different approaches to conducting research.  
The NAS Report’s indictment created an “us vs. them” mentality that still 
lingers.  But the notion that “we’re in this together” is what forensic science 
needs.  Understanding the limitations and longevity of the research 
partnerships is critical to their success. 
5. Standardizing Terminology and Reporting 
Forensic sciences have very few, if any, national standards for 
terminology and reporting.292  Terminology plays a significant role in many 
court settings.  A jury can hear that two samples are a “match,” are 
“consistent with,” are “identical,” are a “likely” match, or are of many other 
kinds of relation to each other, and the jury can take all these relations to 
mean the same thing, even when they do not.293  Worse, without a standard 
language for reporting results, the meanings of the relationship titles can 
 
290 See id. § 7(a)(1)(B)(ii). 
291 The NAS Report notes that underfunded crime labs are in dire need of up-to-date 
equipment.  See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6, 59.  Such inconsistencies in funding 
necessarily lead to inconsistencies in results.  Further, insufficient equipment maintenance is 
also a common problem facing labs.  See id. at 59–60.  Even the FBI lab, which holds itself 
out as using “cutting-edge science,” reported a need for additional equipment.  See id. at 66; 
Using Cutting-Edge Science to Solve Cases and Prevent Acts of Crime and Terror, FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/U79DOF (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
292 See NAS Report, supra note 1, at 21. 
293 See id. 
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vary from scientist to scientist, depending on what standards, if any, the 
scientist operates under.  A “negative” fingerprint analysis, for example, 
could mean that it was “excluded,” “inconclusive,” “unable to locate,” or a 
poor sample, depending on the agency or individual conducting the 
analysis294—all of which are likely indistinguishable to the average 
layperson juror. 
Reporting standards also differ between labs.295  While some reports 
include detailed accounts of the tests and protocols performed, others 
contain barely more than the scientist’s brief conclusory statements 
regarding the test results (which, as stated, could have many different 
meanings).296  Further, reports can differ widely, including what, if any, 
error rates they list and whether and to what extent the reports list the tests 
performed and protocols followed.297  The decision to provide a court with a 
conclusory report, as opposed to a detailed report, falls to the lawyer and 
her client.  To ensure transparency in different scientists’ comparison of 
evidence, they should clearly define what they observe and interpret it as 
“consistent” or “in disagreement.”  They should also document and be able 
to explain re-analyses of what they originally observe and, if they have 
reviewed other evidence in the cases, acknowledge the potential impact of 
their biases.  Without documenting changes in subsequent analyses, 
additional analyses misplace what the examiners originally observed and 
interpreted versus what they might now believe after comparing it with the 
record. 
A forensic research partnership could pioneer standardized 
terminology and reports.  Such standardization would allow juries to hear 
consistent, reliable, and clear testimony with respect to forensic evidence.  
It would also prevent forensic witnesses from obfuscating  results through 
exaggerated reporting methods.  As a baseline, the International 
Organization for Standardization has already promulgated some 
international guidelines for general competence requirements to carry out 
certain tests or calibrations, which include standards for data reporting.298  
While adopting these international guidelines throughout the United States 
would not necessarily solve all terminology and reporting issues, it would, 
at the very least, provide some reference points for uniform vocabulary and 
reporting protocols. 
 
294 See id. at 141. 
295 See id. at 21 (“Some forensic science laboratory reports meet [a high] standard of 
reporting, but many do not.”). 
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298 Id. at 21, 113–14. 
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B. DRILLING DOWN ON THE DETAILS: LONGER-TERM GOALS 
While the primary efforts of research partnerships—such as directed 
research and standardizing terminology—are broad, big picture 
accomplishments, there are other (I hesitate to say “secondary”) 
significantly needed benefits that would take some time to realize. 
1. Certifying Practitioners and Labs 
The lack of certification programs for both practitioners and labs 
engenders inconsistencies.  Currently, lab accreditation is only required in a 
handful of states,299 and judges and juries are often unfamiliar with the 
certification processes used by different organizations.  In Texas, for 
example, forensic labs must meet statutory accreditation requirements for 
forensic evidence to be admissible.300  Still, a roof leak in a Houston DNA 
lab went unchecked for years, contaminating evidence maintained in a 
storage facility and rendering it unusable.301 
The absence of required certifications for practitioners is problematic 
as well.  Very few states have any sort of mandatory accreditation or 
accountability programs for their scientists.302  ASCLD/LAB offers 
accreditation that aligns with the international guidelines described 
above,303 but in most jurisdictions accreditation is not mandatory.304  
According to ASCLD/LAB, the United States has 383 crime labs accredited 
in its program.305  Even in disciplines where some organizations do offer 
certifications, many extremely experienced practitioners choose not to even 
 
299 Although accreditation is not mandatory, “[o]ther states with various types of forensic 
[oversight] boards include: Arizona, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New 
York, Rhode Island and Washington.”  TEX. FORENSIC SCI. COMM’N, JUSTICE THROUGH 
SCIENCE (2011), available at http://goo.gl/2y9v0L; see also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful 
Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 
170 (2007) (“The scandals have prompted Texas and Oklahoma to require their crime 
laboratories to be accredited, joining New York, which has mandated accreditation since 
1994.” (citations omitted)). 
300 See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 (West Supp. 2013).  Labs are not, 
however, required to be accredited to admit into evidence latent print examinations and 
various other forms of forensic analysis.  Id. art. 38.35(a)(4). 
301 See Giannelli, supra note 299, at 190–91 (citation omitted). 
302 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
303 Quality Policy, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS./LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., 
http://goo.gl/WUFaIE (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
304 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 199–200.  
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local agency labs, 31 are federal labs, 19 are international labs, and 26 are private labs.  
Accredited Laboratory Index, AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. / LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., 
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pursue the certifications.306  Without any requirement that forensic evidence 
witnesses hold certifications, there is little reason for many practitioners to 
pursue them.  This undercuts the validity of such certifications for those that 
do choose to pursue them. 
Moreover, the lack of certification programs results in practitioners 
with disparate proficiencies.  In 1978, the Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) sponsored a lab proficiency testing program, and 
more than 200 crime labs throughout the country participated.307  The 
program showed a wide range of proficiency levels.308  Labs operating at 
lower proficiency levels failed most often in interpreting test results because 
of careless error, lack of experience, utilizing improper methodology, 
standard contamination or mislabeling, and inadequate databases or 
standard spectra.309  Another entity that conducted further testing from 1978 
to 1991 found similar results.310  Despite these glaring errors dating back to 
1978, there has been no comprehensive reform.311   
A national forensic science standards entity could provide for 
certifications for both labs and practitioners.  Providing one national 
certification program would ensure baseline standards for all labs and 
enhance predictability in courtrooms.  Further, the entity could create 
certification systems for specific forensic science disciplines.  Such 
certification requirements could provide for a base level of education, 
experience, and expertise, making the voir dire stage of tendering a witness 
as an expert much simpler and the results much more reliable.  Requiring 
certain educational steps before one is able to practice in the forensic 
sciences would encourage universities to create forensic science courses.  
This increased demand would also help encourage forensic science research 
and promote education programs to broadly disseminate results.312 
 
306 See, e.g., Diane L. France, Forensic Anthropology: A Brief Review, CENGAGE 
LEARNING, http://goo.gl/KUB5s3 (last Apr. 14, 2014) (“Presently, not all individuals who 
identify themselves as forensic anthropological experts are board certified; although almost 
all have at least a master’s degree and several years of experience.”). 
307 See Giannelli, supra note 299, at 213. 
308 See id. at 213–14 (“Seventy-one percent of the crime laboratories tested provided 
unacceptable results in a blood test, 51.4% made errors in matching paint samples, 35.5% 
erred in a soil examination, and 28.2% made mistakes in firearms identifications.” (citation 
omitted)); id. at 214 (noting that “[a] wide range of proficiency levels among the nation’s 
laboratories exists, with several evidence types posing serious difficulties for the 
laboratories” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
309 See id. at 214. 
310 See id. at 215. 
311 See id. at 214. 
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§ 5(d)(1)(D) (2012). 
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2. Codes of Ethics 
Forensic scientists frequently encounter ethical issues because they 
may be paid by the government but offer their services in criminal trials to 
both the government and the defense.  Practitioners also need to be able to 
operate in situations where there will be little, if any, oversight and where 
biases might be significant motivators.  To address these concerns, several 
forensic science organizations have adopted codes of ethics,313 but 
currently, “there are no consistent mechanisms for enforcing any of the 
existing codes of ethics.”314  A federal entity could mandate such a code of 
ethics and allow for the slight variations different forensic disciplines may 
require.  Further, tying this code of ethics to certifications in the various 
disciplines would help effect wider adoption. 
3. Coordinating National Databases 
Forensic science in a criminal case usually involves matching some 
type of unknown sample to one or more known samples with the goal of 
producing a match or exclusion.315  The probability of matching an 
unknown sample to a known person or thing increases with the amount of 
known samples available to search against.  More far-reaching databases of 
forensic samples would provide scientists with increased amounts of known 
samples.  Some forensic science disciplines have already started national 
databases, such as the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS).316  
The FBI also manages a database, which includes fingerprints, criminal 
histories, mug shots, and other information associated with individuals.317  
Another example is the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and 
Explosives’ database for ballistic imaging.318 
But the mere existence of these databases is not enough.  Even CODIS 
currently suffers from fragmentation and backlogs.  DNA evidence is 
submitted into CODIS, which itself is made up of three different groups for 
 
313 See, e.g., American Academy of Forensic Sciences Bylaws, AM. ACAD. OF FORENSIC 
SCIS., http://goo.gl/6lMgGx (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
314 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 26. 
315 See Allan Sincox & Marijane Hemza-Placek, Challenging the Admissibility of DNA 
Testing, 83 ILL. B.J. 170, 171 (1995) (outlining the steps of DNA testing typically used by 
police agencies, called Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism testing). 
316 See Laboratory Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/XlzG6D (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
317 Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF 
INVESTIGATION, http://goo.gl/B5nvNW (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
318 National Integrated Ballistic Information Network, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL TOBACCO & 
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the local, state, and national data.319  One FBI report revealed that the 
average time it takes for the FBI to provide DNA results is approximately 
150 to 600 days.320  Related to this steep turnaround time is the backlog of 
samples.  In 2009, the United States had a backlog of 300,000 DNA 
samples.321  And despite its wealth of data, the FBI’s fingerprint database 
still poses problems for forensic scientists.  The database’s equipment 
vendors do not follow the same standards for importing data; law 
enforcement agencies and labs do not always have the resources to interact 
with it, and jurisdictional disagreements and differences in policies prevent 
agencies from sharing fingerprint data more broadly.322 
For the forensic sciences that already have national databases, a federal 
entity could mandate the use of such databases and dictate the way local 
agencies interact with them.  This would prevent many of the access and 
sharing problems law enforcement agencies currently experience.  For 
forensic disciplines that do not have significant national databases, a federal 
entity could pattern new databases from the successes seen with other 
databases.  This would allow a central authority to apply best practices in 
database management from one discipline to another. 
4. Independence of Forensic Labs 
Forensic labs currently maintain a cozy relationship with law 
enforcement and prosecution offices, both financially and geographically.  
In fact, a survey found that approximately 79% of 300 forensic labs studied 
were located within law enforcement or public safety agencies, and 57% 
worked exclusively with evidence submitted by law enforcement.323 
In addition, there is a wide disparity in the resources available to 
defense counsel compared with prosecutors and law enforcement 
agencies.324  Prosecutors often have cost-free access to their local or branch 
crime labs.325  And while indigent defendants secured the due process right 
 
319  See JEREMIAH GOULKA ET AL., RAND CTR. ON QUALITY POLICING, TOWARD A 
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323 Paul C. Giannelli, Independent Crime Laboratories: The Problem of Motivational 
and Cognitive Bias, 2 UTAH L. REV. 247, 250 (2010). 
324 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 75–76. 
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to expert defense witnesses in Ake v. Oklahoma,326 they often do not have 
reciprocal rights of access or the means to afford private defense experts.327 
5. Developing Education Programs 
The NAS Report criticized forensic sciences for the absence of 
doctoral programs in forensic science and the dearth in quality and funding 
of forensic science education programs generally.328  While each university 
will have to specifically address how forensic science fits into its 
curriculum, a collaborative effort with crime labs to promote Bachelor of 
Science degrees (as opposed to a Bachelor of Arts in Forensic Science 
found at some schools) will improve forensic science education.  These 
degrees may supplant the “apprenticeship” system found in some forensic 
disciplines, but the training component can be fine-tuned and bolstered in 
the confines of a formal university program.  These education programs 
could serve to benefit not only the practitioners themselves, but also 
lawyers and judges.329 
V. BUILDING ON EXISTING MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS TO IMPROVE 
QUALITY AND COST 
The NAS Report’s cardinal recommendation was the creation of a 
single forensic science entity to promote an “aggressive, long-term agenda 
to help strengthen the forensic science disciplines.”330  The NAS Report 
envisioned a national entity that would be responsible for overseeing 
research and determining standards.331  This broad undertaking was 
immediately met with skepticism and resistance.332  I would like to keep the 
NAS’s “aggressive long-term agenda[,]” but replace the goal of creating a 
single, national entity with that of creating a number of smaller research 
partnerships that share their work with a larger clearinghouse (perhaps the 
new National Commission on Forensic Science) that tracks the universe of 
research being conducted.  Of course, any reform has drawbacks, and the 
research partnership is not immune to downsides.  Nonetheless, the past 
 
326 See 470 U.S. 68, 83–84 (1985). 
327 See Giannelli, supra note 186, at 75–76. 
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five years of debate have shown that everyone has an opinion.  Even though 
we have struggled to execute those opinions, we can look to some of the 
current frameworks that are attempting to embrace forensic reform for 
guidance. 
A. INCUBATING FORENSIC SCIENCE REFORM: IDEAS AT HOME AND 
ABROAD 
U.S. forensic science represents a patchwork quilt of standards and 
policies.  Because thousands of jurisdictions have their own operating 
procedures, consistency and predictability are elusive.  It seems that a 
logical starting point would be to consider pooling and sharing forensic 
resources across state and even international borders.333  Indeed, the 
European Union has embraced the notion that “forensic cooperation does 
not stop at Europe’s borders but needs to be seen in the context of 
international forensic cooperation around the world.”334  Moreover, the 
United Kingdom—which has been on the forefront of forensic development 
for decades—has made significant inroads in forensic reform by using a 
grassroots approach rather than a top-down legislative thrust upon reluctant 
labs. 
The harsh truth is that the United States does not have the budget 
needed to legislate a comprehensive federal forensic science agenda.  Yet, 
forensic sciences cannot afford an ad hoc fix or wait for the system to self-
correct on the back-end in the postconviction setting.  Allowing innocent 
people to languish in prison until the criminal justice system finds the time 
and opportunity to remedy its errors arguably amounts to a human rights 
catastrophe.  That should not be the system we settle for.  Forensic science, 
thus, needs coordination and creative resourcing through research 
partnerships that will grow the roots for reform.   
This Part begins by outlining two U.S. examples of reform, both of 
which are in early stages.  Next, it describes forensic reform progress in the 
United Kingdom and the European Union to draw lessons that can enhance 
a U.S. research partnership model. 
 
333 See Pawel Rybicki, Standardization in the Area of Scientific Evidence in European 
Union, in POLICING IN EUROPE, 16 J. POLICE STUD. 91, 92–94 (2010).  Moreover, the 
ancillary benefit to this construct is that, with crime becoming increasingly global, having 
unified forensics in place makes good investigative sense as well.  See id. at 93. 
334 RICHARD GILL, FORENSIC SCI. SERV., STUDY ON OBSTACLES TO COOPERATION AND 
INFORMATION-SHARING AMONG FORENSIC SCIENCE LABORATORIES AND OTHER RELEVANT 
BODIES OF DIFFERENT MEMBER STATES AND BETWEEN THESE AND COUNTERPARTS IN THIRD 
COUNTRIES 6 (2008), available at http://goo.gl/t45ui6. 
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1. Test-Tube Babies: Two U.S. Examples 
Two U.S. labs have committed to forensic science research while also 
performing casework.  Both labs—one a local initiative and the other a 
product of the Department of Defense (DoD)—solve problems the NAS 
Report addressed.  The labs’ structures and operational frameworks provide 
a network of oversight, maximize efficiency and analytical quality, and 
focus on collaboration and uniformity to establish forensic standards in both 
research and casework. 
a. The Washington, D.C. Department of Forensic Sciences 
On October 1, 2012, the District of Columbia’s newly built 
Consolidated Forensics Laboratory and its newly created Department of 
Forensic Sciences335 (DFS) opened for business.336  The lab houses a public 
health lab, the medical examiner’s office, and a hybrid of the police 
forensics lab and the new DFS crime lab.337  Eventually, the police crime-
scene unit will be phased out, and the all-civilian DFS crime lab, along with 
the health lab, will be under DFS’s jurisdiction.338 
The primary motivation for creating DFS and building the crime lab 
was the NAS Report.339  DFS and the crime lab are the District of 
Columbia’s response to the Report’s call for a unified, independent agency 
that would promulgate, implement, and oversee robust standards and 
practices for the forensic sciences, albeit on a more local level than the 
Report had in mind.  A secondary, but more public, motivating factor was 
the recent front-page news coverage highlighting forensic labs’ substandard 
practices and the lack of effective oversight.340  With DFS, the District 
aimed to achieve independence—not only from conducting forensic 
analysis in borrowed space or contracting analyses with labs outside the 
 
335 Establishment of the Department of Forensic Sciences, D.C. CODE § 5-1501.02 (2011). 
336 Andrea Noble, Forensics Laboratory Opens in D.C., WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2012, at 
A15; Zoe Tillman, D.C. Crime Lab Chief Outlines Strategy for Preventing Scandals, BLOG 
OF LEGAL TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012, 12:52 PM), http://goo.gl/zXXMfP. 
337 See Sam Pearson, District Moves Away from Police Control of Forensic Functions, 
HOMICIDE WATCH D.C. (Jan. 2, 2013 9:00 AM), http://goo.gl/IwzMox. 
338 See id.; see also Tillman, supra note 336. 
339 See Pearson, supra note 337; cf. Tillman, supra note 336; Zoe Tillman, In Q&A, D.C. 
Forensic Sciences Chief Says Lab Moving Toward Accreditation, BLOG OF LEGAL TIMES (Jan. 
28, 2013, 12:40 PM), http://goo.gl/I4cMOX.  Specifically, the District of Columbia endeavored 
to respond to how the Report identified crippling fragmentation as the most significant threat to 
forensic science quality and credibility.  In particular, the District of Columbia aimed to resolve 
the documented lack of uniform standards, training, and accreditation, as well as effective 
oversight of forensic science practices.  See Tillman, supra note 336. 
340 See, e.g., Peters, supra note 129. 
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area,341 but also independence from law enforcement and political pressure, 
as recommended by the NAS Report.342  DFS hopes to accomplish this by 
both having its own building and phasing law enforcement personnel out of 
its operations. 
Another goal for DFS is to encourage and maintain efficiency.  Having 
a single department overseeing the efforts of several groups in the same 
physical area provides central oversight, uniform standards of operation, 
and a manageable system of checks and balances.343  By housing several 
interactive departments under one roof, DFS hopes to encourage 
communication and collaboration among units, thereby increasing its 
overall efficiency and preventing backlogs.  With a single department at the 
administrative helm, and a common intent to promote and maintain high 
standards, those standards would more likely be followed, and procedural 
missteps would be discovered before things get out of hand.   
b. The Department of Defense Forensic Enterprise Directive 
DoD has also made operational quality at its forensic labs a priority.  A 
recent DoD directive establishes policies for military forensic work and 
delegates responsibilities for different forensic tasks and areas among 
groups within DoD.344 
The directive seeks to establish increased collaboration and 
communication among various DoD divisions in an effort to “develop and 
maintain an enduring, holistic, global forensic capability to support the full 
range of military operations.”345  The directive sets up a central committee 
to coordinate all forensic enterprise activities.  Responsibilities for 
promulgating standards and monitoring implementation and practices are 
delegated to different groups within the DoD.346 
 
341 See Noble, supra note 336. 
342 See Pearson, supra note 337.  DFS Director Max Houck admitted that understanding 
and maintaining his lab’s independence from law enforcement will be among its more 
difficult tasks.  See Tillman, supra note 339.  Yet, he is hopeful that its independence from 
both law enforcement and political pressure will allow DFS to focus more intently on 
grounding its results upon good science, highly trained (civilian) personnel, and continuing 
education for analysts.  See id.; see also Tillman, supra note 336. 
343 See Pearson, supra note 337; Tillman, supra note 339. 
344 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DIR. No. 5205.15E, DOD FORENSIC ENTERPRISE § 1(a) 
(Apr. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 5205.15E]. 
345 See id. 
346 See id.  For instance, the act places certain forensic disciplines like DNA, trace, and 
latent prints in the hands of the Secretary of the Army, while other forensic disciplines—
image and video analysis, for example—are housed under the Secretary of the Air Force.  
See id. 5205.15E § 1(d)-(e). 
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The goals outlined in the directive seem to mirror those DFS sought in 
terms of collaboration, uniformity, and quality.  All appear intent on 
establishing a central oversight entity over different groups performing 
different forensic discipline functions and on promoting collaboration 
among the groups.  The DoD directive sets up a uniform system of 
standards and procedures to guide forensic activity.347 
The directive further establishes a rather complex web of directors and 
advisors to establish policy and monitor performance with respect to 
different forensic disciplines, in keeping with standards and procedures 
established by the central committee.348  Much like DFS, the purpose here is 
likely to maximize efficiency and analysis quality while minimizing error.  
And as with DFS, the difficulty likely will be to strike a balance between 
providing both local oversight and forensic practice monitoring and global 
oversight of the collaboration and communication among a number of 
interdependent groups. 
2. Across the Pond: Lessons from the United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom has arguably been on the forefront of forensic 
science for decades.  From its crime scene investigation in the Jack the 
Ripper case, to its embrace of DNA fingerprinting, to the demise of the 
iconic Forensic Science Services (FSS), the United Kingdom has 
experienced a roller coaster in forensic science administration.  
Understanding the United Kingdom’s success requires a review of its 
previous failed attempts to increase quality. 
a. First Steps: The Forensic Science Service 
FSS was once a dominant forensic force in the United Kingdom.349  At 
one time, FSS operated a monopoly of the United Kingdom’s forensic 
science workload.350  In 1991, however, FSS became an executive agency, 
which ran more like a business and, for the first time, charged for its 
services.351  As a government-owned company, FSS sold its services to 
police forces and in December 2010, held 60% of the forensic science 
market share.352  In 1995, FSS created the first DNA database.353  Each 
 
347 See id. 5205.15E, Enclosure 3, § 1. 
348 See id. 5205.15E, Enclosure 3. 
349 See SCI. & TECH. COMM., FORENSIC SCI. SERV., HOUSE OF COMMONS, SEVENTH 
REPORT OF SESSION 2010–12, at 9 (2011) [hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT], available at 
http://goo.gl/69lYWU . 
350 See id. 
351 See id. at 10. 
352 See id. at 3. 
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year, FSS works on more than 120,000 cases, employing over 1,000 
scientists.354 
Still, the United Kingdom is not without its stories of wrongful 
conviction.  In 1974, a pub bombing left 21 people dead and 160 injured.355  
On the night of the bombings, six Irishmen were arrested, and in 1975, the 
men were convicted based on confessions, evidence linking the men to the 
Irish Republican Army, and forensics suggesting the men handled 
explosives.356  They were beaten and even tortured, but with a series of 
opportunities to rectify the situation, the courts balked and left the men both 
legally and physically defenseless.357  Their first appeal was denied, their 
civil action against police for assault was dismissed, and a referral by the 
Home Secretary to review the case in 1987 was largely ignored.358 
With controversy building each day the men sat in jail, a new Home 
Secretary referred the case to an appeals court yet again, this time with 
support from the director of public prosecutions, who decided he would not 
fight for the convictions to stand.359  The court determined that the two 
issues addressed—the voluntariness of the confessions and sufficiency of 
forensic evidence—both signaled that the convictions were 
unsupportable.360  The forensic tests were originally held to confirm that 
two of the six men handled explosives; however, scientists later admitted 
that “a range of innocent products” could produce the same positive 
results.361  This “miscarriage of justice” came to an end in 1991, when the 
six men were finally freed sixteen years after their convictions.362  Their 
release proved to be a watershed moment for U.K. forensic science. 
The day after the “Birmingham Six” were released, the government 
called for a royal commission to report on forensic science issues.363  
Amidst sweeping calls for changes, there were virtually no major 
 
353 See PARLIAMENTARY OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH., POSTNOTE: THE NATIONAL DNA 
DATABASE 1 (2006), available at http://goo.gl/Kxj3SE. 
354 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 349, at 9. 
355 See Kent Roach & Gary Trotter, Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror, 
109 PENN ST. L. REV. 967, 975 (2005). 
356 See id.; see also Gary Edmond, Whigs in Court: Historiographical Problems with 
Expert Evidence, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 123, 145 (2002). 
357 See Roach & Trotter, supra note 355, at 975–77. 
358 See id. 
359 See id. at 977. 
360 See id. 
361 See Clare Lissaman, Birmingham Six Release Remembered, BBC (Mar. 14, 2011, 
12:06 AM), http://goo.gl/LZpOZt. 
362 See id. 
363 See Stewart Field & Philip A. Thomas, Justice and Efficiency? The Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice, 21 J.L. & SOC’Y. 1, 1, 5 (1994). 
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recommendations in the 1993 report, aside from suggesting an advisory 
council to oversee the use of forensics.364  A few years later, FSS put its 
own group together to address quality standards.365  FSS was already well 
on its way to a quality framework based on ISO 17025, an international 
accreditation standard, but aimed for a broader-reaching approach.366 
b. Learning to Walk: The International Organization for Standardization 
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) offers an 
international standard for lab quality.367  ISO 17025 applies to testing and 
calibration labs, and ISO suggests that accreditation organizations use its 
standards to measure quality through both managerial and technical 
requirements.368  The management requirements focus on policy-oriented 
changes within labs to ensure quality, including policies, standards, and 
procedures.369  The technical requirements emphasize scientist competence, 
environmental conditions, methodology, reporting requirements, and 
equipment management.370 
In an effort to increase quality, the government in 1999 focused on 
registering practitioners with a voluntary program for assessing forensic 
science competence.371  The standards required an assessment of 
competence and reassessment every four years.372  While the voluntary 
program began as a government-funded enterprise, the ultimate goal was to 
reach 10,000 registered practitioners and become self-financing, but by 
2004, it had only 1,800 members.373  With less-than-successful enrollment, 
a prominent police association withdrew its support, and government 
 
364 See id. at 2–5. 
365 See Written Evidence Submitted by the Forensic Science Regulator, FORENSIC SCI. 
SERV. (2011), available at http://goo.gl/CAfxjB. 
366 See id.; see also INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 
ISO/IEC 17025: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE COMPETENCE OF TESTING AND 
CALIBRATION LABORATORIES (2005) [hereinafter ISO 17025], available at 
http://goo.gl/Oox8EW.  ISO sets forth voluntary international standards, with its ISO 17025 
creating requirements for competency in testing and calibration.  Id. at 1. 
367 See ALAN G. ROWLEY, UNITED NATIONS INDUS. DEV. ORG., COMPLYING WITH ISO 17025: 
A PRACTICAL GUIDEBOOK FOR MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS OF LABORATORY ACCREDITATION 
SCHEMES BASED ON ISO 17025:2005 OR EQUIVALENT NATIONAL STANDARDS 1 (2009), available 
at http://goo.gl/tQBRzz. 
368 See ISO 17025, supra note 366, at vi. 
369 See id. at 2–3. 
370 See id. at 10–23. 
371 See Brian Rankin, Forensic Practice, in CRIME SCENE TO COURT: THE ESSENTIALS OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 1, 18–19 (Peter White ed., 3d ed. 2010).  
372 See id. 
373 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 349, at Ev 75. 
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funding was transferred to the National Policing Improvement Agency.374  
Realizing that focusing on individual practitioners failed to regulate quality 
at the organizational level, the National Policing Improvement Agency 
decided to remove all aid.375 
Over time, FSS experienced severe financial troubles, which some 
attributed to the large number of forensic services it provided, as opposed to 
private labs that provided only the most lucrative services.376  In an attempt 
to rectify the situation, FSS was granted trading fund status in 1999 to 
increase the organization’s financial flexibility.377  Six years later, FSS was 
established as a govco, a “[g]overnment-owned, contractor-operated” 
organization.378  The government intended to create a kind of public sector–
private market partnership that would provide the efficiency of the private 
market with the ability to control quality and standards.  As a result, many 
other companies entered the market, driving competition up and costs 
down.379  After reportedly losing about two million pounds a month, the 
government decided to shut down FSS in favor of an entirely private 
market.380  As the organization that employed 1,600 prepared to close, the 
decision caused public backlash, with some accusing the government of 
allowing cost to determine justice.381 
c. Running Forward: Privatization and Regulation 
As the private market increased its activities, and concerns that the 
government was favoring cost over quality endured, the government 
stepped in and created the forensic science regulator, a publicly funded 
position not directly controlled by the government.382  The regulator 
explained what he called the “most obvious risk” in closing FSS: going 
from very stringent accreditation requirements to a nonaccredited 
environment.383  A condition required to close FSS alleviated this concern: 
only ISO 17025-accredited labs could receive FSS work.384  Additionally, 
 
374 See id. 
375 See id. 
376 See id. at 13. 
377 See id. at 5 (citation omitted). 
378 Id. at 5, 9. 
379 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 349, at 23 (citation omitted). 
380 See Forensic Science Service to Be Wound Up, BBC (Dec. 14, 2010, 10:07 AM), 
http://goo.gl/99St9M. 
381 See id. 
382 See GOULKA ET AL., supra note 319, at 4–5; Forensic Science Regulator, GOV.UK, 
http://goo.gl/iqXd1T (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
383 See SEVENTH REPORT, supra note 349, at 37 (citation omitted). 
384 See id. at 35 (citation omitted). 
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all DNA labs reporting to the police had to comply with ISO 17025 
standards, and all fingerprint labs had to comply by 2015.385 
In March 2012, “the government closed the FSS from taking on more 
material”386 and achieved its goals of increasing both efficiency and quality 
through regulation and privatization.387  DNA profiles are reported within a 
few days of when the lab receives the materials.388  Making the turnaround 
even more impressive, profiling is available for all crime types, rather than 
just serious crimes: in the United Kingdom, anyone arrested can be required 
to give DNA for profiling purposes.389  Although the United Kingdom has 
significantly fewer cases, lower crime, and a lower population than the 
United States, the comparison between the two countries’ DNA systems is 
staggering.390  While it is possible the United Kingdom’s lack of backlog 
and quick turnaround stem from its demographic differences, the more 
likely answer is that the United Kingdom has succeeded at effectively 
managing its DNA system.  Within two years of setting up its DNA 
database, the United Kingdom saw backlogs rise into the six-figures.391  
But, just two decades later, the United Kingdom has no backlog for its 
DNA analysis—a foreign concept in the United States.392 
In addition to requiring accreditation to address quality issues,  the 
United Kingdom mandated standards for processing crime scenes, 
transporting samples to labs, and now requires different labs to analyze 
samples from the accused and the victims.393  Additionally, all data is 
 
385 See id. at 36–37 (citation omitted). 
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387 See GOULKA ET AL., supra note 319, at 2 (noting that the United States could apply 
the English system to reduce cost and improve outcomes). 
388 See id. at 7. 
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at 32, 33. 
392 See id. at 33–34. 
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INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 20 (2010), available at 
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submitted to an accreditation service to ensure standards are met, and the 
regulator may, at any time, enter a lab to check compliance.394 
3. Wishful Thinking: The European Union 
It is useful to contrast the United Kingdom’s “deregulation” of 
forensic science with the attempt at centralization in continental Europe.  
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) aims to be 
recognized as Europe’s leading authority on forensic science.395  ENFSI 
endeavors to maintain the quality of forensic science and develop forensic 
services delivery throughout the European Union.  ENFSI itself is a 
network of forensic institutes and labs geographically spread across Europe, 
including those from E.U. member states and most E.U. candidate 
countries.  As of 2012, ENFSI membership consisted of sixty-four institutes 
spread across thirty-six countries.396 
ENFSI recognizes that the lack of common standards is a barrier to 
cooperation between forensic science labs.  Further, the benefits of common 
standards in the fight against crime have been a priority for ENFSI for some 
time.397  In its policy statement on accredition, ENFSI makes the call to 
harmonize forensic standards and procedures.398  It states that “ENFSI 
wishes to promote consistent and reliable scientific evidence through the 
whole forensic process from the scene of [the] crime to court.”399 
It is obvious—at least from the European Union’s point of view—that 
common standards are essential to effectively investigating crimes that 
involve forensic information that spans across national borders.  For 
example, the Prüm Treaty (legislation before the European Union) relies on 
member states to make forensic information (DNA and fingerprints) 
contained in national databases available for searching.400  To facilitate this 
process, the data must be in a standard format so that such searches are 
technically feasible. 
Yet, with all of its centralization, the European Union itself lacks the 
standards in forensic science that it wants.  There is no institutional control, 
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395 See EUR. NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ANNUAL REPORT 2011, at 3 (2011), 
available at http://goo.gl/9epLJk. 
396 See About ENFSI: Members, ENFSI, http://goo.gl/IyrNRJ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
397 See generally Ekrem Malkoc & Wim Neuteboom, The Current Status of Forensic 
Science Laboratory Accreditation in Europe, 167 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L. 121, 124–25 (2007). 
398 See STANDING COMM. FOR QUALITY & COMPETENCE, ENFSI, POLICY ON STANDARDS 
FOR ACCREDITATION 1 (2010). 
399 Id. 
400 Press Release, European Comm’n, The Integration of the “Prüm Treaty” into EU-
Legislation (June 12, 2007), available at http://goo.gl/QUaf86. 
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and thus “no institution which develops forensic science standards, or 
enforces and supervises their implementation.”401  Indeed, while Europe’s 
crime labs acknowledge that the creation of an independent forensic 
institute is just a matter of time, that time may be well off in the future. 
The same might hold true for the United States.  Even with a tested 
model from the United Kingdom and analogous U.S. examples, several 
obstacles stand in the way of change that would revolutionize U.S. forensic 
science industrywide: fragmentation, a lack of public interest, and drastic 
demographic differences.  Without addressing these issues preliminarily, 
any attempts at reform would be terminal at worst and a prolonged illness at 
best, just as the United Kingdom saw through its two-decades long 
experiment.  Research partnerships—akin to the U.K.’s grassroots forensic 
overhaul—could be the drastic (and palatable) change needed. 
B. ACKNOWLEDGING THAT PROBABLY NOTHING IS PERFECT 
While creating research partnerships is likely a far cry from a massive 
federal level entity, a bottom-up approach will bridge the chasm between 
forensic research and practice, while developing the infrastructure needed 
for industrywide reform. 
The drawback to a grassroots effort is, of course, its inherent ad hoc 
nature that, without any additional controls, will simply be a redundancy of 
the current system.  As the NAS Report noted: “[I]t is not clear how these 
associations interact or the extent to which they share requirements, 
standards, or policies.  Thus, there is a need for more consistent and 
harmonized requirements.”402  In the research partnership model, this 
question of interaction will be an issue.  Research partnership agencies and 
subagencies might not have adequate means of communication.  A method 
for communicating efforts to improve standardization with other researchers 
and crime labs would be needed.  The risk is that, with so many different 
organizations all attempting to reform forensic science, there is bound to be 
overlap and inefficiency.  To this end, establishing an advisory 
committee,403 where membership represents a balanced cross-section of the 
different disciplines and research labs, would go a long way toward 
communicating concerns and implementing uniform standards among the 
research partnerships. 
 
401 Rybicki, supra note 333, at 91, 99. 
402 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 78. 
403 The proposed Forensic Science and Standards Act of 2013 provided for the creation 
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H.R. 3064, 113th Cong. § 8 (2013). 
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Nonetheless, the work will have to proceed in conversation with the 
broader criminal justice system.  Reforming forensic science in a vacuum—
even with the cooperation of crime labs—leaves out the end users of the 
forensic product.  Thus, research must be performed with attention to 
courtroom admissibility and the realities of the criminal justice system.  
Such an effort requires transparency in both evidence analysis and use (the 
encompassing crime-to-conviction model), achieved only by clearly 
documenting what information is observed and how it has been interpreted.  
After observing the evidence, for example, it must then be translated into 
value for a particular purpose (“suitability”).  Defining what is suitable 
evidence is a policy decision that may be static or plastic.  Based on the 
evidence observations, the analysis should articulate why, for example, a 
print is or is not suitable for a specific purpose.  Clearly defining 
“suitability” should be considered not only for ensuring consistency 
between examiners but also for identifying complex comparisons, which 
may require additional measures of quality assurance to mitigate risks of 
error.  Forensic reform must also keep in mind the judges and juries who 
will analyze and assess the information. 
As Jane Moriarty posits, even when science is clearly inadequate, 
judges have been unwilling to rigorously examine it because they are set in 
their ways and “cannot seem to imagine” excluding evidence that 
commonly comes in.404  In one case where defense counsel challenged his 
client’s conviction based on the NAS Report’s condemnation of the 
science’s validity, the judge reasoned that the NAS Report “merely presents 
a general picture of the current processes and pitfalls of toolmark 
identification and identifies possible methods of improvement.”405  Other 
judges have likewise noted that the NAS Report’s recommendations are 
important but still refuse to consider them.406 
Any forensic science reform needs also to accept that courts are 
particularly resistant to change.  Because Daubert requires judges to act as 
gatekeepers, admitting “good science” into their courtrooms and turning 
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away everything else,407 forensic reform should encourage the 
dissemination of forensic research in terms non-scientists can understand.408  
Without an understanding of the faulty validity of many of the forensic 
sciences, judges will continue to admit such evidence at trial. 
The American criminal justice system is made up of counties, cities, 
states, and the federal government.  Despite being seriously underfunded, 
understaffed, and undertrained in forensic science, state and local 
organizations handle the vast majority of law enforcement activity.409  
Alongside the lack of training and funding, the lack of unification among 
the various systems results in fragmentation.  If accreditation and 
standardization criteria exist, they differ markedly from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.410  In fact, most U.S. jurisdictions require no formal 
certification for their forensic science practitioners.411  The structure of the 
American government, with shared responsibility between the federal and 
state governments, presents its own problems for reworking the system.  As 
the NAS Report noted, the federal government cannot unilaterally mandate 
a new forensic program without infringing on authorities typically reserved 
to the states.412  Instead, collaboration would be necessary.  With a system 
so divided, however, the idea of universally overhauling forensic science is 
 
407 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (“[U]nder the 
[Federal Rules of Evidence] the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony 
or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.”). 
408 In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923), the court set forth a standard for 
admitting expert testimony in which “the thing from which the deduction is made must be 
sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it 
belongs.”  Id. at 1014.  Under Frye, admitting evidence requires generally accepting (1) the 
theory supporting the scientific conclusion, and (2) the techniques and experiments leading 
to the conclusion.  See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for 
Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 
(2001).  For states using Frye’s general acceptance test, problems arise in determining what 
is generally accepted, defining the “scientific community” in question, and determining how 
much agreement is needed for “general acceptance.”  Thus, the uniform standards achieved 
by research partnerships will assist courts in applying the Frye standard to forensic evidence 
testimony by clarifying any ambiguities inherent in Frye’s admissibility requirements. 
409 See NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 6. 
410 See id. 
411 See id. 
412 See id. at 13.  The United States boasts a system of limited federal government.  As 
stated in the Tenth Amendment, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  The Tenth Amendment is the primary vehicle for 
arguments that the federal government is overstepping its authority and encroaching on 
states’ rights.  See Charles Cooper, Reserved Powers of the States, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE 
TO THE CONSTITUTION (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005), available at 
http://goo.gl/yTN88m. 
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enough to send any politician running.  And if the workload does not do it, 
the funding woes certainly would. 
While news stories have extensively detailed faulty forensics leading 
to innocent persons spending time in prison, their focus is on bad science 
rather than ineffectual standards that fail to regulate a science that works 
when it is conducted properly.413  Unless the public focus shifts from 
blaming science to blaming policies, it is unlikely that Congress will make 
any significant steps toward unifying the system.  We need to invest in a 
more efficient and quality friendly framework. 
C. SETTING A STAGE FOR REFORM 
Even with these obstacles, the United States could still achieve a 
program comparable to that in the United Kingdom by utilizing existing 
frameworks to create research partnerships. 
The United Kingdom’s forensic science program, once a 
predominantly public entity, thrived after the government released control 
in favor of the competition and cost effectiveness that come with private 
markets.  Although many fought back, arguing that closing FSS favored 
saving money at the expense of quality,414 data suggests that is not the case.  
It is doubtful that research partnerships might ultimately privatize the U.S. 
system of forensic science (or at least decouple crime labs from law 
enforcement agencies).  After all, the United Kingdom is far smaller, with 
fewer jurisdictions and less crime.  Moreover, similar privatization in the 
U.S. prison system415 has been widely criticized.416  Finally, the U.K. 
system could be characterized as capitalism all dressed up: it requires much 
 
413 See, e.g., Wrongly Convicted Man Now Free Thanks to DNA Evidence, WSB–TV 
ATLANTA (Nov. 12, 2007, 5:30 PM), http://goo.gl/YG6KA9. 
414 See SCIENCE & TECH. COMMITTEE, WRITTEN EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY DR. FIONA 
PERRY, 2010-11, H.C., ¶ 1iv–vii (U.K.), available at http://goo.gl/XWvScj; see also Forensic 
Science Service to Be Wound Up, supra note 380. 
415 In the 1980s, the federal and state governments began contracting with private 
companies for incarceration services to reduce costs.  See Nicole B. Cásarez, Furthering the 
Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal Corrections: The Need for Access to Private 
Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 255–57 (1995).  Over the past three decades, 
the federal government expanded the privatization.  By 2009, 15% of federal prisoners were 
incarcerated in privately operated correctional facilities.  See David C. Fathi, The Challenge 
of Prison Oversight, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1453, 1461 (2010) (citation omitted). 
416 As one study demonstrated, California state-run prisons spend about $162 per inmate 
per day, compared with only $72 in privately run prisons.  See Private Prisons Save Money, 
Report Says, CORRECTIONAL NEWS (July 28, 2011), http://goo.gl/2dNlGX.  While the prison 
system has largely been criticized in the United States, the two situations are less analogous 
than it might readily appear.  The issue with prison privatization is that to turn a profit, more 
prisoners are needed.  See Private Prisons, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://goo.gl/qyxGZi 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
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more than a new dress and some shoes.  To decrease costs while improving 
quality standards, as the United Kingdom did, the traditional idea behind 
capitalism—privatizing industry to increase competition—would probably 
require significant government regulation. 
In the realm of forensic science, there are only so many samples 
available for labs to analyze.  Taking steps toward establishing a privatized 
(and thus, competitive) forensics industry—coupled with quality regulation 
and government funding—would promote the use of cost-efficient 
procedures that produce valid, reliable, and accurate results.  In this respect, 
decoupling crime labs from law enforcement agencies would add additional 
layers of protection.  As one former FBI assistant director explained, 
investigations showed that labs controlled by law enforcement often 
reported results biased in favor of the prosecution.417  Whether intentional 
or not, the bias undermines the system’s credibility, calling into question 
reliable techniques and reducing confidence in forensics as a whole. 
Coupled with the decreased costs and increased efficiency that would 
follow, a system of research partnerships sets the “path forward” that the 
NAS Report called for back in 2009.  While forensic science is not prepared 
for its own version of an FDA, the use of something less drastic than a 
federal watchdog is a good incentive to induce action.  While the specter of 
wrongful convictions should be (although I acknowledge it is not) a good 
enough reason to consider a change in course, there are other incentives.  If 
forensic science as an industry would adopt a research partnership platform, 
we could finally begin to set baseline requirements for standards and quality 
while simultaneously increasing efficiency and decreasing costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence admissibility is largely dependent on implementing and 
enforcing comparable standards, which should be achieved for the entire 
forensic process, from crime scene to courtroom.  Yet, consistency and 
predictability across the forensic nervous system are few and far between.  
Ultimately, we can do better.  Establishing a federal entity to oversee 
reforms in forensic science attempts to accomplish too much in a sector that 
remains fragmented and impervious to change.  Research partnerships 
between crime labs and universities, on the other hand, will improve lab 
efficiency, foster communication between labs, and unify oversight.  
Improving crime labs would directly correlate to keeping innocent 
defendants out of jail, and in some cases, alive.  Research partnerships 
should prioritize the NAS Report recommendations to streamline, simplify, 
 
417 See Marie Cusick, Scandals Call into Question Crime Labs’ Oversight, NPR (Nov. 
20, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://goo.gl/gLXUE8. 
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and accelerate forensic reform.  Only when all crime labs speak the same 
language, use the same methodologies and protocols, and embrace the 
“science” component of their name will forensic science be better.  
Reforming forensics is no small task.  It will take cooperation from 
scientists, lawyers, judges, and policymakers—but it can be done.  Forensic 
science should prevent wrongful convictions, not cause them. “There are 
only two mistakes one can make on the road to truth: not going all the way, 
and not starting.”418  This is our opportunity to set forensic science right 
before it gets the result wrong and it stays that way. 
 
418 Michael Morton & Barry Scheck, Morton, Scheck: Changes Are Long Overdue for 
Texas’ Clemency Process, HOUSTON CHRON. (Oct. 16, 2013, 7:26 PM),  http://goo.gl/JUmnjW. 
